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I. INTRODUCTION 
Kansas trial judges and the news media often have clashed over the 
meaning of the First1 and Sixth2 Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.  
The media assume that the freedom of the press, protected by the First 
Amendment, gives them the right to report comprehensively on court 
cases.  Thus, the media may publicize information that is prejudicial to 
criminal defendants but is inadmissible as evidence in court.  Judges, 
however, assume that they have a high duty to protect defendants’ Sixth 
Amendment right to a fair trial—one in which jurors are impartial and 
have not been influenced by prejudicial publicity.  Judges may try to 
limit publicity to maintain the fairness of criminal or civil proceedings or 
to protect the privacy of trial participants.  Because of their different 
outlooks, judges and the media in Kansas can find themselves in sharp 
conflict. 
An example of this conflict occurred in Saline County, Kansas, 
where a newspaper was covering the jury trial of a defendant who had 
been charged with rape.  When the trial was in its third day and was 
expected to end, the newspaper reported that the defendant recently had 
been sentenced in an earlier sex-related criminal case in a different 
county.3  The district judge in the Saline County rape trial promptly 
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 1. “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . .”  
U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 2. “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, 
by an impartial jury . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 3. David Clouston, Mistrial Declared Because of Article, SALINA J., Aug. 7, 2008, available 
at http://www.salina.com/news/story/mistrial-8-7-08. 
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declared a mistrial, saying the article may have prejudiced the jurors 
against the defendant.4  The judge suggested that the newspaper had not 
acted in the public interest and had published the article merely to boost 
circulation and profits.5  The criticism was echoed in reader comments 
posted on the newspaper’s website, one stating: “If the [newspaper] 
cared about the victim, they would not have printed the article.  Anything 
for a buck!  Even putting [the victim] through hell again.”6  Responding, 
the newspaper’s editor and publisher expressed concern for the victim 
but said that the paper’s practice was to publish information as it became 
available, “not according to a judge’s wishes.  It would be irresponsible, 
and a disservice to our readers, to allow government or any other public 
institution to make news decisions.”7 
A second example, from Johnson County, Kansas, concerns a plastic 
surgeon who disposed of an office computer by placing it on the curb by 
his home.  He had removed the computer’s random access memory and 
anticipated that the city trash collectors would take the computer.  A 
private passer-by picked up the computer, however, and reactivated it.8  
He discovered that it contained personal information about the surgeon’s 
patients, including “before-and-after” photographs of their cosmetic 
treatment.9  The passer-by then gave the computer to a television 
station.10  The station’s news staff began to contact patients identified on 
the computer, and prepared to broadcast a report that the surgeon had 
discarded the computer without first purging it of sensitive information.  
The surgeon, however, aimed to prevent the newscast, and convinced a 
judge to issue a restraining order barring the station from broadcasting 
                                                          
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Posting of Anonymous to Join the Discussion, http://www.salina.com/news/story/mistrial-
8-7-08 (Aug. 8, 2008). 
 7. Tom Bell, Editorial, A Surprise Decision in Mistrial, SALINA J., Aug. 9, 2008, available at 
http://www.salina.com/print/rape-mistrial-edit.  Each day of the rape trial, the presiding judge, the 
Hon. Jerome Hellmer, admonished the jurors to avoid news about the case.  Clouston, supra note 3.  
When the article about the defendant was published by the Salina Journal, however, he declared a 
mistrial in response to a defense attorney’s request and without objection from the prosecution.  Id.  
Before the mistrial declaration, jurors were not questioned about whether they had seen the Journal 
article.  Id.  County Prosecutor Christina Trocheck said questioning the jurors would not have been 
effective, indicating that it only would have made them suspicious of the defendant.  Id.  The article 
contained information that already had been published and posted online by a newspaper in the 
county where the defendant had previously been convicted.  Id.  Tom Bell, editor and publisher of 
the Journal, emphasized that the article was published on an inside page of the paper under a routine 
headline, and he said it was “nothing out of the ordinary.”  Bell, supra. 
 8. Dan Margolies, Doctor Dropping Suit Against KCTV, KAN. CITY STAR, July 15, 2005, at 
C3. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
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photographs and “any data or information” found on the computer.  
Condemning the order as an “insidious form of government censorship” 
and an “obvious violation of the First Amendment,” the station 
unsuccessfully challenged it in district court.  The station then appealed 
to the Kansas Supreme Court.11 
A third example occurred in a McPherson County, Kansas, capital 
murder case, where a judge ordered that defense attorneys and 
prosecutors not release any of their motions or other court papers to the 
media.12  He directed that the papers be given to him first so that he 
could determine whether, if filed as public records, they would result in 
prejudicial publicity to the defendant.13  He said that, after personally 
reviewing the papers, he would decide whether the clerk of court should 
file them.  The judge understood that, before actually sealing a record, he 
would have to conduct a hearing and specifically find that making the 
record public would be prejudicial to the defendant.14  Three Kansas 
newspapers and the Kansas Press Association, however, appealed to the 
Kansas Supreme Court, arguing that the judge was not empowered to 
keep the records secret before conducting a hearing on whether to seal 
them.15 
                                                          
 11. This summary of the dispute is based on petitions, memoranda, and other documents filed 
by Monarch Plastic Surgery, P.A. and Meredith Corporation d/b/a KCTV5 in the District Court of 
Johnson County, Kansas, Case No. 05-CV-04838, between June 17 and June 28, 2005, and later on 
appeal with the Kansas Supreme Court in Case No. 2005-94734 (on file with author).  Attorney 
Bernard J. Rhodes of Kansas City, Missouri, who represented KCTV5, was the one who 
characterized the restraint order as “insidious.”  See sources cited supra.  Dr. Daniel Bortnick of 
Monarch Plastic Surgery was the surgeon who had discarded the computer and sought the order.  See 
sources cited supra.  It originally was issued ex parte June 17, 2005, against KCTV5 by the Hon. 
Kevin P. Moriarty, Johnson County District Court judge.  See sources cited supra.  While the matter 
was pending before the Kansas Supreme Court, KCTV5, which is based in Fairway, Kansas, 
broadcast a report on June 30, 2005, about the surgeon discarding the office computer.  The 
broadcast focused on the fact that the computer should have been purged before being discarded, and 
the station’s news director said there had been a false belief that “‘we were getting ready to 
broadcast personal information that we never had plans to do and never would do.’”  Margolies, 
supra note 8.  After the broadcast and as the matter was pending before the Kansas Supreme Court, 
Monarch Plastic Surgery moved in Johnson County District Court to dismiss its case against 
KCTV5, the station turned over the patient information and destroyed copies, the restraint order was 
dissolved in district court, and the Kansas Supreme Court declared the case moot.  Id.; Notice of 
Dismissal, Meredith Corp. v. Moriarty, No. 2005-94734 (Kan. Sept. 20, 2005). 
 12. Roxana Hegeman, Ex-Mainer Charged with Killing Children, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Oct. 
12, 1999, available at 1999 WLNR 844588. 
 13. Id.; Associated Press, Judge Delays Decision on Records Access in Lindsborg Slayings, 
WICHITA EAGLE, Nov. 2, 1999, at 11A. 
 14. Associated Press, supra note 13. 
 15. Id.  The restriction on access to records was imposed by the Hon. Carl B. Anderson Jr., 
judge in the Kansas Ninth Judicial District.  See id.  Prosecution and defense attorneys both opposed 
the media’s request for more access to court records in the case.  Id.  Assistant Kansas Attorney 
General Al Walczak said that “publicity in a case of this magnitude would be prejudicial in a 
community with a small population.”  Id.  Michael W. Merriam of Topeka, Kansas, who represented 
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The purposes of this Article are to 1) survey significant free 
press/fair trial controversies in Kansas, 2) highlight recurrent and 
emerging issues faced by the state’s judges and journalists, and 3) 
provide an overview of the law on media and public access to Kansas 
court proceedings and records.  The Article begins with a review of 
landmark precedents through which the United States Supreme Court 
charted a course for resolving free press/fair trial issues in Kansas and all 
other states.  The review takes into account precedents that clarify the 
responsibility of trial judges to balance First and Sixth Amendment 
interests.  The review is intended to illuminate how the precedents limit 
judges’ latitude to impose restraints—or “gag orders”—on speech and 
publication and their authority to close courts as means of preventing 
prejudicial publicity.  The Article then addresses the issue of prejudicial 
publicity, with emphasis on the Kansas experience.  The focus is on 
criminal defendants’ claims for mistrials, media objections to gag orders, 
and when criminal, as well as civil, proceedings are presumed to be open 
or may be closed.  The next part of the Article surveys Kansas law, and 
to some extent national law, on the accessibility of court records, both in 
criminal and civil matters.  Because courts in Kansas have not dealt 
directly with some noteworthy free press/fair trial issues, the Article 
reviews certain significant legal developments in other jurisdictions.  The 
Tenth Circuit is among federal jurisdictions that are taken into account, 
because it includes Kansas.  The Article concludes with a consideration 
of selected issues in access to court proceedings and records.  The issues 
include the media’s standing to object to judicially imposed restrictions 
and the nature of court rules on photographing or televising proceedings. 
II. FREE PRESS/FAIR TRIAL LANDMARK CASES 
Landmark decisions by the United States Supreme Court heavily 
influenced the Kansas approach to protecting trials from the effects of 
prejudicial publicity. 
                                                                                                                       
the media, expressed a contrary view, saying: “‘It is a common misconception to believe an open 
hearing and open records—even in a capital case—will create prejudice . . . .  [O]penness enhances 
basic fairness of the trial.’”  Id.  Ultimately, records became public when the defendant entered a 
plea of guilty.  Roxana Hegeman, Associated Press, Lindsborg Murderer Confesses—In a Plea 
Agreement to Avoid the Death Penalty, A Father Admits to the Gruesome Killing of his Three 
Children, WICHITA EAGLE, June 13, 2000, at 1A.  The Kansas Supreme Court dismissed the matter 
as moot in Hutchinson Publishing Co. v. Anderson, No. 84820 (Kan. Feb. 29, 2000). 
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A. The Responsibility of Trial Judges 
In the 1960s, the United States Supreme Court handed down two 
significant rulings regarding trial judges’ responsibility to protect 
criminal defendants from prejudicial publicity.  In a 1965 case, Estes v. 
Texas, Billy Sol Estes had been convicted of swindling.16  He was a well-
known, newsworthy figure, once characterized as a “confidence man 
who bilked Texas farmers out of millions of dollars.”17 
After a Texas appellate court affirmed his conviction, Estes appealed 
to the United States Supreme Court, claiming that his right to due 
process had been denied because of prejudicial, televised news coverage 
of his case.18  After reviewing the record, the Supreme Court found that 
there indeed had been “[m]assive pretrial publicity”19 and that the 
televised trial coverage had resulted “in a public presentation of only the 
State’s side of the case.”20 
In a five to four decision, the Supreme Court reversed Estes’s 
conviction.  Writing for the majority, Justice Tom C. Clark took a firm 
stand against televised trials.  He stressed that a trial judge’s 
responsibility is to “make certain that the accused receives a fair trial.”21  
In his view, if a judge permits television in the courtroom, it becomes an 
“ever-present distraction.”22  The concurring opinion by Chief Justice 
Earl Warren added that the appropriate use of television cameras “does 
not extend into an American courtroom.”23  Television reporters, he 
indicated, must leave their cameras at the courthouse door because, 
inside, they only have the “rights of the general public, namely, to be 
present, to observe the proceedings, and thereafter, if they choose, to 
report them.”24  In a second concurring opinion, Justice John M. Harlan 
was less resolute than Justice Clark on the issue of television cameras in 
courtrooms.25  In a dissent, Justice Potter Stewart strongly cautioned  
 
                                                          
 16. 381 U.S. 532, 534 n.1 (1965). 
 17. Wayne King, Estes Links Johnson to Plot, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1984, at 9. 
 18. Estes, 381 U.S. at 534–35. 
 19. Id. at 535. 
 20. Id. at 551. 
 21. Id. at 548. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 585 (Warren, C.J., concurring). 
 24. Id. at 586. 
 25. Id. at 596 (Harlan, J., concurring).  Justice Harlan said that conditions eventually could 
change, so that television coverage of trials may “be subject to re-examination in accordance with 
the traditional workings of the Due Process Clause.”  Id. 
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against taking a hard line against television coverage of court 
proceedings.26 
A year after deciding Estes, the United States Supreme Court again 
looked at trial judges’ responsibility to manage newsworthy trials.  In 
Sheppard v. Maxwell, the Supreme Court found that a trial judge had 
failed to protect the defendant “from the inherently prejudicial publicity 
which saturated the community and to control disruptive influences in 
the courtroom . . . .”27  The defendant was Sam Sheppard, a doctor of 
osteopathic medicine who specialized in surgery.28  He had been 
convicted of fatally bludgeoning his wife in 1954 at their home in 
Cleveland, Ohio.29  The Supreme Court, with a lone dissent,30 held that 
Sheppard had not received due process and ordered a new trial.31  Justice 
Clark, again writing for the majority, noted that the publicity in Estes 
“was not nearly as massive and pervasive” as in Sheppard.32  A dramatic 
illustration of the intense publicity in Sheppard occurred during a three-
day inquest—televised live from a high school gymnasium—featuring a 
lengthy examination of Sheppard, who was not represented by counsel, 
and which “ended in a public brawl.”33  Then, during a nine-week trial, 
“bedlam reigned” in the courtroom.34  For example, when the judge met 
with counsel in chambers, “news media representatives so packed the 
judge’s anteroom that counsel could hardly return from the chambers to 
the courtroom.  The reporters vied with each other to find out what 
counsel and the judge had discussed, and often these matters later 
appeared in newspapers accessible to the jury.”35 
Justice Clark noted that “unfair and prejudicial news comment on 
pending trials has become increasingly prevalent.”36  Still, the Supreme 
Court was not willing to place direct restraints on the media’s traditional 
                                                          
 26. Id. at 613–14 (Stewart, J., dissenting).  Justice Stewart said the record made it “crystal 
clear” that the trial judge had been in command of the Estes case and that the trial was a “mundane 
affair.”  Id. at 613.  He also expressed concern that the majority’s reasoning was “disturbingly alien 
to the First and Fourteenth Amendments’ guarantees against federal or state interference with the 
free communication of information and ideas.”  Id. at 614. 
 27. 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966). 
 28. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 231 F. Supp. 37, 39 (S.D. Ohio 1964), rev’d, 346 F.2d 707 (6th Cir. 
1965), rev’d, 384 U.S. 333 (1966). 
 29. Id. at 40. 
 30. Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 363 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 31. Id. at 362–63 (majority opinion). 
 32. Id. at 353. 
 33. Id. at 354. 
 34. Id. at 355. 
 35. Id. at 344. 
 36. Id. at 362. 
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freedom to report on court proceedings.37  Justice Clark characterized 
what happens in a courtroom as “‘public property.’”38  Nevertheless, he 
stressed that trial judges are responsible for managing proceedings to 
protect a defendant’s right to a fair trial.39  He indicated that judges, to 
fulfill their responsibility, may take the following measures: question 
prospective jurors closely during voir dire about their possible exposure 
to prejudicial publicity;40 limit reporters to a specified location within the 
courtroom and prescribe and enforce conduct rules for them;41 prohibit 
trial participants, including any lawyer, party, witness, or court official, 
from divulging prejudicial matters to the media;42 request that city and 
county officials prevent any of their employees who have information 
about a case from disseminating it;43 warn reporters about the 
“impropriety” of broadcasting or publishing information that is not 
admissible as evidence in the proceedings;44 and when a reasonable 
likelihood exists that prejudicial publicity will prevent a fair trial, 
continue the case, change the venue, or sequester the jury.45 
B. Gag Orders as Unconstitutional Prior Restraints 
As concern about prejudicial publicity increased throughout the U.S. 
judicial system, the American Bar Association (ABA) developed 
standards for the conduct of trials.46  The ABA standards, published in 
1968, placed heavy emphasis on “safeguarding the interests of a fair 
trial.”47  In fact, the emphasis on fairness was so heavy that skeptics 
questioned whether the ABA had “seriously underestimated the interests 
                                                          
 37. Id. at 350. 
 38. Id. (quoting Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947)). 
 39. Id. at 350–51. 
 40. See id. at 345, 347 (discussing instances when jurors were exposed to outside influences). 
 41. Id. at 358. 
 42. Id. at 361. 
 43. Id. at 362. 
 44. Id. at 362. 
 45. Id. at 363; see also Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 441 (1979) (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting) (citing THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDARDS RELATING TO THE 
ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS § 8-3.2 (2d ed. 1978) 
[hereinafter ABA STANDARDS 2d ed.]) (listing continuance, severance, change of venue, change of 
venire, voir dire, peremptory challenges, sequestration, and admonition of the jury as alternative 
measures).  Regarding Gannett Co. v. DePasquale generally, see infra notes 64–70 and 
accompanying text. 
 46. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS ix (3d ed. 1992) 
[hereinafter ABA STANDARDS 3d ed.]. 
 47. Id. 
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of a free press.”48  Meanwhile, judges across the country were asserting 
strong control over their courtrooms.  As a result, there was “a dramatic 
rise in the number of broad gag orders issued to enjoin any extrajudicial 
comment on a pending case.”49 
Tension over the problem of prejudicial publicity reached a breaking 
point in 1975 in Nebraska.  Authorities charged a man, Erwin Simants, 
with fatally shooting six members of a Nebraska family.50  Public interest 
in the case was high, and the media prepared to cover a hearing on 
whether Simants should be bound over for trial.  A judge, however, 
issued a gag order, prohibiting the media “from releasing ‘for public 
dissemination in any form or manner whatsoever any testimony given or 
evidence adduced during the preliminary hearing.’”51 
The media appealed, challenging the judge’s order as a prior restraint 
that violated the First Amendment.  The Nebraska Supreme Court 
modified the order, limiting its scope somewhat, but otherwise denied the 
media’s appeal.52  After reviewing the United States Supreme Court’s 
opinion in Sheppard, the Nebraska Supreme Court said it was “clear that 
the Supreme Court of the United States has never said, in the context 
with which we are here concerned, that such restraints may never be 
imposed when necessary to assure trial by an impartial jury.”53 
In Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, however, the United States 
Supreme Court found that the gag order in the Simants case was an 
unconstitutional prior restraint.54  Writing for the majority, Chief Justice 
Warren E. Burger said that the order “violated settled principles: ‘[T]here 
is nothing that proscribes the press from reporting events that transpire in 
the courtroom.’”55  The Court indicated that a gag order against the 
media is unconstitutional unless prejudicial publicity poses a clear and 
present danger to the fairness of a trial.56  Therefore, before issuing a gag 
order against the media, a trial judge must “determine (a) the nature and 
extent of pretrial news coverage; (b) whether other measures would be 
likely to mitigate the effects of unrestrained pretrial publicity; and (c) 
                                                          
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. State v. Simants, 236 N.W.2d 794, 796 (Neb. 1975), rev’d sub nom. Neb. Press Ass’n v. 
Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976). 
 51. Id. at 797. 
 52. Id. at 805–06. 
 53. Id. at 800. 
 54. 427 U.S. 539, 570 (1976). 
 55. Id. at 568 (quoting Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362–63 (1966)).  Other justices 
filed concurring opinions; there was no dissent. 
 56. Id. at 563. 
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how effectively a restraining order would operate to prevent the 
threatened danger.”57 
In reviewing the gag order in the Simants case, the United States 
Supreme Court said that the judge should have determined the “probable 
extent of publicity” about the case,58 considered “whether measures short 
of an order restraining all publication” would have protected the 
defendant’s right to a fair trial,59 and assessed the “probable efficacy” of 
a prior restraint “as a workable method” for maintaining fairness of the 
proceedings.60 
C. Closure of Court Proceedings Presumed Unconstitutional 
Prejudicial publicity continued to be a pressing concern for trial 
judges throughout the United States.  Under Sheppard, judges were 
required to control their courtrooms to protect defendants’ Sixth 
Amendment right to a fair trial.61  Yet, Nebraska Press made clear that 
judges’ courtroom control was not unlimited.62  They rarely, if ever, 
could constitutionally restrain the media from reporting what they 
learned in open court.63  Thus, judges turned to an alternative way to 
prevent prejudicial publicity, which was simply to close the court. 
Media challenges to this approach resulted in an important series of 
United States Supreme Court decisions on the openness of courts and on 
trial judges’ responsibility to protect defendants against prejudicial 
publicity. 
A 1979 case, Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, centered on objections by 
Rochester, New York newspapers to a judge’s closure of a pre-trial 
hearing in a highly publicized murder case.64  The purpose of the hearing 
was to determine whether incriminating statements that defendants had 
given to police were involuntary and therefore should be suppressed.65  
The judge granted a motion—made by defense attorneys without 
objection from the prosecution—to close the hearing because of an 
“unabated buildup of adverse publicity” about the case.66  After hearing 
                                                          
 57. Id. at 562. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 563. 
 60. Id. at 565. 
 61. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 357–58 (1966). 
 62. Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 570. 
 63. Id. 
 64. 443 U.S. 368, 376 (1979). 
 65. Id. at 374–75. 
 66. Id. at 375. 
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objections to his closure order, the judge determined that “an open  
suppression hearing would pose a ‘reasonable probability of prejudice’” 
to the defendants.67 
The Supreme Court upheld the trial judge,68 finding that the media 
and the public “have no constitutional right under the Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to attend criminal trials”69 and that the judge’s 
determination to close the pre-trial suppression hearing was “consistent 
with any right of access the [media] may have had under the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments.”70 
The Supreme Court, however, did not treat DePasquale as a 
controlling precedent a year later in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. 
Virginia, when the media objected to closure of a trial.71  Before the 
closure, Virginia authorities had placed the defendant, John Paul 
Stevenson, on trial three times in open court.72  In the first trial, he had 
been convicted of fatally stabbing a motel manager, but won a reversal 
by claiming improper use of evidence against him.73  The state’s second 
and third attempts to try him on the murder charge ended in mistrials.74  
Before the fourth trial, the judge granted a defense motion for closure to 
prevent public disclosures of testimony by witnesses against Stevenson.75  
The prosecution did not object.76 
Writing for the plurality, Chief Justice Burger noted that the issue in 
DePasquale had been whether a judge could constitutionally close a pre-
trial proceeding, as opposed to a trial.77  He also noted that DePasquale 
had not addressed whether the First Amendment, as opposed to the Sixth, 
guaranteed a right of the media and the public to attend trials.78  Because 
closure of a trial was directly at issue in Richmond Newspapers, Chief 
Justice Burger seized the opportunity to declare that “the First 
                                                          
 67. Id. at 376. 
 68. Id. at 394.  Justice Potter Stewart wrote the majority opinion, with concurrences by others.  
Justice Blackmun also filed a partial dissent, however, in which three justices joined.  He essentially 
took the position that the Sixth Amendment protects the media and the public’s interest in attending 
criminal trials.  Id. at 432–33 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 69. Id. at 391 (majority opinion). 
 70. Id. at 392. 
 71. 448 U.S. 555, 563–64 (1980). 
 72. Id. at 559. 
 73. Id. (citing Stevenson v. Commonwealth, 237 S.E.2d 779, 780 (Va. 1977)). 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 560. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 564.  Justices White and Stevens concurred; Justices Brennan, Marshall, Stewart, and 
Blackmun concurred in the judgment; Justice Rehnquist dissented. 
 78. Id. 
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Amendment guarantees of speech and press, standing alone, prohibit 
government from summarily closing courtroom doors which had long 
been open to the public at the time that Amendment was adopted.”79 
Chief Justice Burger characterized the courtroom as “a public place 
where the people generally—and representatives of the media—have a 
right to be present.”80  Historically, he said, criminal trials were 
“presumptively open.”81  Also noteworthy, he said, was the relationship 
between the openness of a trial and its “proper functioning.”82  The 
presence of the media and the public “gave assurance that the 
proceedings were conducted fairly to all concerned, and it discouraged 
perjury, the misconduct of participants, and decisions based on secret 
bias or partiality.”83  Judges may close a trial, according to Chief Justice 
Burger, only if they establish, through findings articulated in the record, 
that alternatives would not be effective and that there is an “overriding 
interest” in closure.84 
Concurring in the judgment, Justice William J. Brennan stressed the 
tradition and value of the openness of trials.  The First Amendment, he 
said, “embodies more than a commitment to free expression and 
communicative interchange for their own sakes; it has a structural role to 
play in securing and fostering our republican system of self-
government.”85  Justice Brennan explained: 
Implicit in this structural role is not only “the principle that debate on 
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,” but also 
the antecedent assumption that valuable public debate—as well as other 
civic behavior—must be informed.  The structural model links the First 
Amendment to that process of communication necessary for a 
democracy to survive, and thus entails solicitude not only for 
communication itself, but also for the indispensable conditions of 
meaningful communication.86 
In four cases between 1982 and 1986, the United States Supreme 
Court further established that criminal proceedings generally would be 
open to the media and the public.  In the first case, Globe Newspaper Co. 
v. Superior Court, the Supreme Court struck down a state statute that 
                                                          
 79. Id. at 576. 
 80. Id. at 578. 
 81. Id. at 569. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 581. 
 85. Id. at 587 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 86. Id. at 587–88 (citation omitted). 
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mandated closure of trials during testimony by minor rape victims.87  
Proponents of the statute had asserted that it protected the privacy and 
psychological well-being of sex-offense victims.88  Because the statute 
protected the victims, the proponents argued, they would be more willing 
to come forward and report crimes to the police.89  The Court, however, 
held that the statute mandating closure of trials was not effective in 
protecting the victims.90  Nothing prevented the media from learning 
about the trial through a transcript of the proceedings or from 
knowledgeable court personnel or others.91  Writing for the majority, 
Justice Brennan said that trial judges may consider closing trials only on 
a case-by-case basis, explaining: 
[T]he circumstances under which the press and public can be barred 
from a criminal trial are limited; the State’s justification in denying 
access must be a weighty one.  Where, as in the present case, the State 
attempts to deny the right of access in order to inhibit the disclosure of 
sensitive information, it must be shown that the denial is necessitated 
by a compelling governmental interest, and is narrowly tailored to serve 
that interest.92 
Then, in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise 
I), the Supreme Court reviewed its limitations on closure of criminal 
court proceedings.93  A defendant had been charged with the rape and 
murder of a teenage girl.94  During a voir dire examination of prospective 
jurors—an event that lasted six weeks—the trial judge closed the 
proceeding to the media and the public, and then denied a newspaper’s 
request for a transcript.95  In his majority opinion, Chief Justice Burger 
called the extended closure “incredible” and said the judge’s order and 
denial of a transcript were unconstitutional.96  He said: 
The presumption of openness may be overcome only by an overriding 
interest based on findings that closure is essential to preserve higher 
values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.  The interest is to 
                                                          
 87. 457 U.S. 596, 598, 610–11 (1982). 
 88. Id. at 600. 
 89. Id. at 609–10. 
 90. Id. at 608–09. 
 91. Id. at 610. 
 92. Id. at 606–07.  Justice O’Connor concurred in the judgment; Chief Justice Burger dissented, 
joined by Justice Rehnquist, and Justice Stevens also dissented. 
 93. 464 U.S. 501, 503 (1984). 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 503–04. 
 96. Id. at 513. 
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be articulated along with findings specific enough that a reviewing 
court can determine whether the closure order was properly entered.97 
At the same time, in Waller v. Georgia, the issue of access to 
suppression hearings reached the Court.98  Georgia authorities had 
charged several persons with racketeering, gambling, and 
communicating information related to gambling.99  The defendants 
moved to suppress certain evidence, including wiretaps.100  In response, 
the prosecution moved to close a hearing on the suppression motion, 
arguing that conducting it in the open would expose sensitive 
investigative information that needed to be protected.101  Despite 
objections from certain defendants, the trial judge ordered closure of the 
suppression hearing.102  The Supreme Court reversed the judge’s closure 
order, holding that “under the Sixth Amendment any closure of a 
suppression hearing over the objections of the accused must meet the 
tests set out” in First Amendment-based precedents, such as Press-
Enterprise I.103 
Two years later, in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-
Enterprise II), the Supreme Court ruled broadly in favor of access to 
preliminary hearings.104  California authorities had accused a nurse of 
murdering twelve patients by giving them high doses of a heart drug.105  
A magistrate closed a preliminary hearing “because the case had 
attracted national publicity and ‘only one side may get reported in the 
media.’”106  The holding in Press-Enterprise II,107 however, was that the 
closure order was unconstitutional, because it had not met this standard: 
If the interest asserted is the right of the accused to a fair trial, the 
preliminary hearing shall be closed only if specific findings are made 
demonstrating that, first, there is a substantial probability that the 
defendant’s right to a fair trial will be prejudiced by publicity that  
 
 
                                                          
 97. Id. at 510. 
 98. See 467 U.S. 39 (1984) (Powell, J.). 
 99. Id. at 41. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 41–42. 
 102. Id. at 42. 
 103. Id. at 47. 
 104. 478 U.S. 1, 10 (1986). 
 105. Id. at 3. 
 106. Id. at 4 (citation omitted). 
 107. Chief Justice Burger wrote the opinion, with Justice Stevens dissenting, joined in part by 
Justice Rehnquist.  Id. at 3, 15. 
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closure would prevent and, second, reasonable alternatives to closure 
cannot adequately protect the defendant’s fair trial rights.108 
III. PREJUDICIAL PUBLICITY AND FAIR TRIALS IN KANSAS 
A. Claims for Mistrial 
After the Supreme Court’s decisions in Estes and Sheppard, 
appellants in criminal cases in Kansas began to invoke the two 
precedents, though generally without success.  The appellant in one such 
case had been found guilty of entering a supply company through a 
broken skylight and stealing wrenches from a display rack.109  The 
appellant claimed that he had been a victim of prejudicial publicity 
generated by two Hutchinson, Kansas radio stations.110  The stations’ 
news broadcasts had included information or comments about Eldridge’s 
marriage, performed while he was in jail, and a prior conviction in 
another state.111 
In State v. Eldridge, the Kansas Supreme Court ruled that it would 
find denial of due process if “publicity is massive, pervasive and results 
in influences on the jury which are disruptive and prejudicial.”112  The 
radio broadcasts in Eldridge’s case, however, did not meet the standard.  
The Kansas Supreme Court said: “There is no showing in this record that 
a single juror was cognizant of these broadcasts or in any way influenced 
by them.  The decorum in the courtroom appears to have been properly 
maintained entirely free of pervasive and disruptive influences.”113 
The Kansas Supreme Court also ruled against subsequent appellants 
who invoked the Estes and Sheppard precedents, claiming that they were 
victims of prejudicial publicity and had been denied due process.114  The 
                                                          
 108. Id. at 14. 
 109. State v. Eldridge, 421 P.2d 170, 171 (Kan. 1966). 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 173. 
 113. Id. 
 114. See, e.g., Davis v. State, 466 P.2d 311, 315 (Kan. 1970); State v. Paxton, 440 P.2d 650, 654 
(Kan. 1968); State v. Ayers, 426 P.2d 21, 24 (Kan. 1967).  In these cases, the appellants invoked a 
principle that had appeared in both Estes and Sheppard; namely, that “‘a showing of identifiable 
prejudice’” is necessary, unless a court procedure—viewed in the “totality of the circumstances”—
“‘involves such a probability that prejudice will result that it is deemed inherently lacking in due 
process.’”  Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 352 (1966) (quoting Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 
542–43 (1965)).  The appellants claimed that, under this principle, a determination could be made 
that their convictions were due to prejudicial publicity.  Nevertheless, the Kansas Supreme Court did 
not find that publicity in their cases had been sufficient in scope to be prejudicial and result in denial 
of due process. 
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rulings tended to impose a heavy burden on defendants to show that they 
suffered prejudice because of publicity. 
For trial judges who are concerned about the prejudicial effects of 
publicity before trial, the questioning of prospective jurors during voir 
dire is key.  As the Kansas Supreme Court pointed out nearly forty years 
ago: “Basically, the purpose of voir dire examination is to enable parties 
to select jurors competent to judge and determine facts in issue without 
bias, prejudice or partiality.”115  The trial judge has discretion to decide 
the extent of voir dire examination116 and an appellate court essentially 
will not interfere “unless an abuse of discretion is clearly shown.”117 
A 2006 case, State v. Hayden,118 illustrated trial judges’ latitude in 
conducting voir dire when pre-trial publicity is an issue.  The defendant 
in Hayden had been accused of attacking an elderly husband and wife in 
their home with a shovel.119  The wife died, and the defendant was 
convicted of second degree murder and other crimes.120  Before trial, his 
attorney opposed conducting a voir dire examination of the prospective 
jurors as a group, arguing that they “‘w[ould] have to be interrogated as 
to the nature of the publicity [to which they had been exposed]. . . . 
Forthright answers would very likely contaminate the entire 
venire . . . .’”121 
On appeal, the defendant claimed that the trial judge had erred by 
disallowing voir dire examination individually of each prospective 
juror.122  The Kansas Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s claim,123 
however, noting with approval that the trial judge had cautioned the 
prospective jurors as a group not to give “intemperate” answers to 
questions during voir dire.124  The court found that “[t]he judge asked 
very specific questions so that venire members did not blurt out 
unnecessary prejudicial information, and he dismissed jurors who said 
                                                          
 115. State v. Guffey, 468 P.2d 254, 259 (Kan. 1970). 
 116. Id. (citing State v. Maxwell, 102 P.2d 109 (Kan. 1940)). 
 117. Id.; see also Wilson v. Sirmons, 536 F.3d 1064, 1097 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing Mu’Min v. 
Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 427 (1991)) (“The trial court retains great flexibility in conducting voir 
dire.”). 
 118. 130 P.3d 24 (Kan. 2006). 
 119. Id. at 27–28. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 28. 
 122. Id. at 29. 
 123. Id. at 37.  Although the appellant in State v. Hayden did not prevail in arguing that 
individual voir dire should have been allowed, he won reversal of his conviction on another ground.  
Before being retried, however, he pled guilty to second-degree murder and was sentenced to fifteen 
and a half years in prison, with credit for five years he had already served.  See Associated Press, 
Olathe Man Pleads Guilty in Attack on Elderly Couple, TOPEKA CAP.-J., Oct. 13, 2006, at 5C. 
 124. Hayden, 130 P.3d at 37. 
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they could not put what they had seen or heard in the media out of their 
minds to decide the case impartially.”125  The court held that in denying 
the defendant’s request for individual voir dire, the trial judge had not 
abused his discretion, explaining the standard as follows: 
[D]iscretion is abused when judicial action is “arbitrary, fanciful, or 
unreasonable,” which is another way of saying that discretion is abused 
only when no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the 
trial court.  If reasonable persons could differ as to the propriety of the 
action taken by the trial court, then it cannot be said that the trial court 
abused its discretion.126 
Even when jurors are exposed to arguably prejudicial publicity 
during a trial, a defendant may have difficulty showing that a new trial is 
warranted.  For many years, the Kansas Supreme Court has appeared 
reluctant to rule in favor of litigants who complain about prejudicial trial 
publicity.  A case in point occurred in 1905 during a civil dispute in 
Lyon County, Kansas.127  The plaintiff had sued the defendant over a 
$10,000 promissory note, and local newspapers published articles that 
were “distinctly unfavorable” to the plaintiff, both in style and 
substance.128  After a week-long trial, the jurors returned a verdict against 
the plaintiff, and he requested a new trial on the theory that the 
newspaper articles had prejudiced them against him.129  Four jurors 
signed affidavits saying that they had read something in the papers about 
the plaintiff, although eight jurors said they had not.130  The Kansas 
Supreme Court said that jury misconduct was not to be presumed, the 
plaintiff had the burden of proof on the issue of prejudice, the contents of 
the articles read by the four jurors were unknown, and there was “no 
direct evidence” that would justify setting aside the verdict.131 
The spirit of the 1905 case was apparent in subsequent cases.  In 
1973, in Roy v. State, for example, the Kansas Supreme Court stated: 
[This court] has consistently adhered to the well-settled principle 
applicable both to civil and criminal cases, that a juror’s reading of 
newspaper articles pertaining to the trial is not grounds for reversal, 
new trial, or mistrial unless the articles are of such a character that they 
                                                          
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 36. 
 127. See Fields v. Dewitt, 81 P. 467 (Kan. 1905). 
 128. Id. at 468. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
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might have resulted in prejudice to the losing party.  To constitute 
grounds for such action it must affirmatively appear that prejudice has 
resulted, and the party claiming prejudice has the burden of proof.132 
In a 1994 case, State v. Bowen,133 the Kansas Supreme Court reviewed its 
position on trial publicity in some detail.  The defendant in Bowen had 
been charged with first-degree murder and one count of aggravated 
battery in connection with a shooting on a Wichita street.134  On the 
second day of the trial, the Wichita Eagle published an article with this 
headline: “Witness fingers gunman/Woman defies threats to testify in 
friend’s slaying.”135  The first paragraph said: “The murder trial of a 20-
year-old man who police say is a Los Angeles gang ‘banger,’ or hit man, 
opened Tuesday in Sedgwick County District Court with nervous 
testimony from an eyewitness who claimed she had been threatened to 
prevent her from showing up in court.”136  Evidence at trial included 
nothing about the threat that the newspaper had reported.137  In response 
to concern expressed by the defendant’s attorney about the prejudicial 
effect of the article, the trial judge conducted an inquiry as follows: 
THE COURT: Members of the jury, at this time I want to make an 
inquiry of you to each of you answer—I want you to answer the 
question.  There was an article in the paper about this particular case.  
Now, did any of you read that article or see that article?  If you did 
please raise your hand. 
MR. LANGE: I saw the article. 
THE COURT: You saw the article? 
MR. LANGE: I realized what it was about and I didn’t read it. 
THE COURT: And, Mr. Patrick Robinson, you also saw it? 
MR. ROBINSON: Now, I saw the headline and saw a name and then 
set it aside. 
THE COURT: Did anyone else see the article or read any of it?  I see 
no affirmative answers. 
                                                          
 132. 514 P.2d 832, 834 (Kan. 1973) (citations omitted) (rejecting an appeal in a manslaughter 
case on prejudicial publicity and other grounds). 
 133. 867 P.2d 1024 (Kan. 1994). 
 134. Id. at 1027. 
 135. Id. at 1029–30 (citation omitted). 
 136. Id. at 1030 (citation omitted). 
 137. Id. 
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THE COURT: On the basis of merely seeing the headline of the article, 
I do not see that that would in any way . . . influence the jury.  You 
can’t put blinders on the jurors, and, therefore, I will go ahead with the 
trial.  Is the State ready to proceed?138 
The decision of the trial judge to deny a mistrial was upheld as a 
proper exercise of discretion.  The Kansas Supreme Court pointed out 
that the judge initially had taken a precaution against prejudicial 
publicity by admonishing the jury to avoid news reports about the 
case.139  Moreover, the manner in which the judge polled the jury was 
reasonable.140  The court ultimately concluded: 
The fact that a juror has read a newspaper article does not automatically 
constitute grounds for a mistrial.  The two jurors in the instant case who 
saw the single article in question did not indicate that they had read it in 
its entirety.  The content of the offending headlines is not of such a 
nature that prejudice should be presumed.  Bowen had the burden to 
demonstrate that he was prejudiced.141 
In a 2008 case with an ironic twist, a trial court in Johnson County—
rather than the media—was the source of allegedly prejudicial 
publicity.142  An insurance agent had been accused of forgery.143  During 
his trial, the court posted the following information on a website about 
the history of the case: “‘06/01/2006 FILE STAMP 6/1/2006, MOTION 
TO ALLOW EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT’S ADMISSION OF A [sic] 
GAMBLING AND MONEY PROBLEMS.’”144  The entry referred to 
evidence that the judge ultimately refused to admit “because it was 
irrelevant and prejudicial,” but the defendant argued that “‘jurors had 
easy access to this statement via the internet from the privacy of their 
own homes.’”145  After the defendant was convicted, he appealed on 
grounds that included prejudicial publicity, and he requested a mistrial.146  
His appeal was rejected, however.147  The Kansas Court of Appeals noted 
                                                          
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 1030–31. 
 140. Id. at 1031.  The court indicated that the trial judge took some risk in polling the jurors 
about their exposure to publicity, indicating that such polling was a disfavored practice.  The 
concern was that questioning jurors about publicity could lead them to be prejudiced. 
 141. Id. (citations omitted). 
 142. State v. Auch, 185 P.3d 935, 944 (Kan. Ct. App. 2008). 
 143. Id. at 938. 
 144. Id. at 945. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 944. 
 147. Id. at 946. 
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that the declaration of a mistrial is a matter of discretion for the trial 
judge, and an appellate court will not reverse the judge’s decision “unless 
an abuse of discretion is clearly shown” and the defendant proves that he 
or she was “substantially prejudiced.”148  Regarding mistrials generally, 
Kansas law 
gives the trial court the discretion to grant a mistrial when it finds that 
termination is necessary because “[p]rejudicial conduct, in or outside 
the courtroom, makes it impossible to proceed with the trial without 
injustice to either the defendant or the prosecution.”  A mistrial will not 
be granted . . . unless the rights of either the defendant or the State have 
been substantially prejudiced.149 
The Kansas Court of Appeals held that the trial judge’s decision not to 
grant a mistrial was a reasonable exercise of discretion.150  The record of 
the case included no indication that any juror saw the court’s website 
entry or, if any did see it, that the entry caused them to be prejudiced 
against the defendant.151 
 The outcome of this case is consistent with the trend in Kansas.  For 
criminal defendants who challenge their convictions on the ground of 
prejudicial publicity, the burden of proof is high.  Trial judges appear to 
run a minimal risk of being reversed when they deny a motion for a 
mistrial by one who claims to have been a victim of prejudicial publicity.  
A recent survey identified 105 Kansas cases in which prejudicial 
publicity was a ground for appeal, but a preliminary analysis of the cases 
indicated that only one conviction was reversed due to publicity.152 
                                                          
 148. Id. at 944 (citing State v. Dixon, 112 P.3d 883 (Kan. 2005)). 
 149. Id. at 945 (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3423(1)(c) (2007) (prescribing conditions under 
which a trial may be terminated and a mistrial ordered)). 
 150. See id. at 946 (“Because the record in this case fails to indicate that prejudice resulted to 
Auch from the case history posting, he is not entitled to a mistrial in this case.”). 
 151. Id. 
 152.   The survey, initiated by the author and conducted with the help of an assistant in December 
2008 and January 2009, consisted of an electronic database search.  The objective was to identify 
cases in which Kansas appellate courts had reversed a criminal conviction on the ground of 
prejudicial publicity.  Terms used for the search included “publicity,” “trial,” “reverse,” and 
“prejudice.”  Although further analysis of the results is pending, State v. McDonald, 565 P.2d 267 
(Kan. 1977), is the only case found thus far, out of 105, in which a claim of prejudicial publicity was 
upheld.  In that case, the Kansas Supreme Court ruled that the trial judge wrongly denied a defense 
motion to examine jurors regarding circulation of an inflammatory pamphlet about the defendant. 
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B. Gag Orders 
1. Against the Media 
Soon after the United States Supreme Court decided Nebraska Press 
in 1976, the Kansas Supreme Court had occasion to follow the decision 
in a controversy that centered on the Board of Public Utilities of Kansas 
City, Kansas.  A trial court had decided to oust two of the board’s 
members on grounds that they had mishandled certain financial matters.  
On appeal, the ousted board members claimed that the trial court should 
have prohibited the media from reporting witnesses’ testimony.  In State 
ex rel. Tomasic v. Cahill, however, the Kansas Supreme Court upheld the 
ouster and said that, under Nebraska Press, the media were “quite 
properly permitted to report proceedings which took place in open court.  
The need for the public to know what is going on in an ouster proceeding 
is substantial, and certainly outweighs the remote possibility of prejudice 
to parties in this civil proceeding.”153 
Four years later, the court rejected an appeal by a convicted murderer 
who argued that a gag order should have been issued against the media in 
his case. 154  The trial judge’s decision not to issue such a restraint was 
upheld, because no prejudice was alleged or shown.155 
The Kansas Supreme Court thoroughly affirmed its opposition to 
prior restraints in a case that originated in 1993 in Atchison, Kansas.156  
A newspaper reporter was attending a pre-trial criminal hearing in a local 
courtroom.157  The hearing was open to the public,158 and the reporter’s 
presence was ordinary.  Nothing portended the confrontation that was 
about to occur. 
As the reporter watched, the judge considered a defense motion to 
suppress certain evidence.159  The defense attorney argued that the 
prosecution should be barred from using or discussing the defendant’s 
criminal record or outstanding arrest warrants.160  After granting the 
motion, the judge asked whether any other matter needed attention.161  
The attorney then pointed out the presence of the reporter, who worked 
                                                          
 153. 567 P.2d 1329, 1336 (Kan. 1977). 
 154. State v. Jordan, 659 P.2d 1172, 1174 (Kan. 1981). 
 155. Id. 
 156. See State v. Alston, 887 P.2d 681 (Kan. 1994). 
 157. Id. at 683–84. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 683. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 684. 
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for the Atchison Daily Globe, and expressed concern that the newspaper 
might publish a report about the hearing.162  The judge immediately 
ordered the reporter to publish neither the defendant’s criminal history 
nor even the existence of the judge’s order itself.163 
The Globe, however, defied the order, publishing a report about what 
had happened in the courtroom.  As a headline put it: “[Judge] imposes 
gag order on Globe; Tells newspaper not to report order because it might 
prejudice . . . jurors.”164  Another headline said: “Globe publisher says 
public has right to know about case; Judge’s gag order called 
unwarranted.”165  The report began: “The Atchison Daily Globe defied a 
gag order placed on the newspaper by [the judge] because the newspaper 
felt public interest outweighed the reasons for the order . . . .”166  The 
report quoted the publisher as saying: “We respect the judicial system 
and [the judge] and the right for everyone to have a fair trial, but we also 
believe, based on the First Amendment, we have a right to report the 
news.  In this particular place, a gag order on the Globe is not a 
necessary thing.”167 
For its defiance of the gag order, the Globe received a contempt 
citation, but the newspaper successfully appealed.168  In State v. Alston, 
the Kansas Supreme Court reversed the gag order and the contempt 
citation.169  The court recognized that “those who see and hear what 
transpired in an open courtroom can report it with impunity,” and “once 
a public hearing has been held, what transpired there could not be subject 
to prior restraint.”170  The court followed the United States Supreme 
Court’s rejection of a gag order in Nebraska Press171 as an 
unconstitutional prior restraint.172 
At the same time, the Kansas Supreme Court embraced a line of 
precedent that preserved the media’s defense against “transparently 
invalid” gag orders.173  The Globe was subject to the general rule that 
                                                          
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. (quotation marks omitted). 
 165. Id. (quotation marks omitted). 
 166. Id. (quotation marks omitted). 
 167. Id. (quotation marks omitted). 
 168. Id. at 692. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at 688. 
 171. Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976), is chief in the line of precedents 
embraced in State v. Alston. 
 172. Alston, 887 P.2d at 692. 
 173. Id. at 691 (citing In re Providence Journal Co., 820 F.2d 1342, 1347–48 (1st Cir. 1986), 
modified on reh’g, 820 F.2d 1354 (1st Cir. 1987)). 
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persons must obey a judicial order even if they believe it is 
unconstitutional.174  Even if they challenge the constitutionality of the 
order on appeal, they must continue to obey it while awaiting a 
decision.175  If they disobey the order and are cited for contempt, they are 
barred from collaterally attacking the constitutionality of the order during 
the contempt proceeding.176  The collateral bar rule has been considered 
necessary for the “efficient and orderly administration of justice.”177 
In Alston, however, the Kansas Supreme Court found that the Globe 
was not bound by the collateral bar rule when it disobeyed a gag order 
and published news about a pre-trial criminal hearing.178  The collateral 
bar rule does not apply when a judicial order is “transparently invalid,” 
the court said, explaining: 
 In this case, the . . . order was transparently unconstitutional.  The 
trial court failed to make the requisite Nebraska Press findings.  The 
[newspaper had based its news report on information that was available 
from] the court’s records and in open court prior to the gag order.  The 
order was issued without a full and fair hearing with all the attendant 
procedural protection.179 
The court found that the Globe had disobeyed the gag order in good 
faith.180  “In the course of two hours, the Globe received notice of the 
order, contacted the judge, and attempted to contact its attorney and the 
attorney for the Kansas Press Association . . . .”181  Relief through the 
judicial system, however, was not available before the newspaper’s 
publication deadline.182  According to the court, “[o]nly where timely 
access to an appellate court is not available can the newspaper publish 
and then challenge the constitutionality of the order in contempt 
proceedings.”183  Alston established that a newspaper “seeking to 
challenge an order it deems transparently unconstitutional must concern 
itself with establishing a record of its good faith effort.”184 
                                                          
 174. Id. at 690. 
 175. See id. 
 176. See id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. at 691. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. at 691–92. 
 181. Id. at 691. 
 182. Id. at 692. 
 183. Id. at 691. 
 184. Id. 
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2. Against Trial Participants 
To judges, issuing gag orders against trial participants—those from 
whom journalists seek newsworthy information and comment—has 
appeared to be a reasonable and practical alternative to imposing a prior 
restraint on the media.  Lucy Dalglish, director of the Reporters 
Committee for Freedom of the Press in Arlington, Virginia, has noted 
that restraints on trial participants’ speech have increased.185  As she put 
it: “‘Are we seeing more gag orders?  Absolutely.  In general they are a 
tool that was used by courts depending on the jurisdiction, but once they 
catch on they spread like wildfire.’”186 
Gag orders against trial participants generally have not been as 
controversial in Kansas as in some other jurisdictions.  U.S. District 
Judge Sam A. Crow, however, was the central figure in two noteworthy 
cases that involved gag orders in Topeka, Kansas.  In United States v. 
Walker, a defendant had been charged with cocaine possession, and he 
requested an “order directing the United States Attorney, his assistants, 
law enforcement officers, and any other persons associated with the 
above-referenced case to refrain from making any extrajudicial 
statements about this case.”187  The defendant said a gag was necessary, 
because publicity “indicating that he was the leader of the Topeka Black 
Gangster Disciples gang jeopardized his ability to obtain a fair trial.”188  
Judge Crow denied the request, however, saying: 
 Though the speech of an attorney participating in judicial 
proceedings may be subjected to greater limitations than could 
constitutionally be imposed on other citizens or on the press, the 
limitations on attorney speech should be no broader than necessary to 
protect the integrity of the judicial system and the defendant’s right to a 
fair trial.  This Court has stated that before a district court issues a 
blanket prior restraint, it must, inter alia, “explore whether other 
available remedies would effectively mitigate the prejudicial publicity,” 
and consider “the effectiveness of the order in question” to ensure an 
impartial jury. 
 
 
 
                                                          
 185. Jason Dearen, Gag Orders Becoming Court Trend, THE OAKLAND TRIBUNE, Nov. 27, 
2005, at A1. 
 186. Id. 
 187. 890 F. Supp. 954, 956 (D. Kan. 1995). 
 188. Id. 
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 Less restrictive alternatives to an injunction against speech include 
such possibilities as a change of venue, trial postponement, a searching 
voir dire, emphatic jury instructions, and sequestration of jurors.189 
Judge Crow concluded that a fair trial could be achieved without a gag 
order.190  He favored such less restrictive alternatives as “a probing voir 
dire and the use of proper jury instructions.”191 
In a high-profile civil case in 1998, however, Judge Crow imposed a 
gag order with unusually broad scope against trial participants.  He was 
presiding over Koch v. Koch Industries, Inc., a complex case that had 
begun in 1985.192  The plaintiffs were stockholders who claimed that they 
had been victims of misrepresentation by principals in the second-largest, 
privately held corporation in the United States.193  As the time for trial 
drew near, Judge Crow issued a gag order to minimize publicity about 
the case.194  Through his order, he prevented any parties, or their agents 
or representatives, “from contacting or polling, for any purpose, any 
person listed as a prospective juror”; precluded “all parties, counsel and 
witnesses from making extrajudicial statements to the news media”; 
forbade any party, or any business, association, entity or commission 
controlled by a party, from advertising through newspapers, radio, or 
television in the seventeen counties within the court’s jurisdiction; and 
required prospective jurors to make “every effort” to avoid reading 
newspaper or magazine articles, listening to any radio programs, or 
viewing any television programs that could relate to the case.195 
Before issuing his gag order, Judge Crow did not hold a hearing 
specifically to give news organizations an opportunity to register 
objections.196  He then denied a motion by the media to intervene and 
object after he issued the gag order.197  Although he acknowledged that a 
judge should not impose a prior restraint on speech without first 
conducting a hearing, he characterized Koch as an “atypical” case, and  
 
 
                                                          
 189. Id. at 957 (citations omitted). 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. 6 F. Supp. 2d 1185 (D. Kan. 1998), aff’d, 203 F.3d 1202 (10th Cir. 2000). 
 193. See Sarah Lunday, Judge Rejects Much of Suit Against Koch: Both Brothers Claim Victory 
as Key Parts of Suit by Bill Koch Still Remain Against Charles Koch, Company, WICHITA EAGLE, 
July 16, 1997, at 1A. 
 194. Koch, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 1187. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. at 1189. 
 197. Id. at 1189–90. 
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said he had raised the subject of the gag order in open court during a 
status conference.198  He further stated: 
[A]ll parties agreed that the court had provided the relief that they had 
requested.  Lead counsel for both sides expressed great enthusiasm for 
the order entered by the court, as the news media had previously been 
playing one side off the other in an effort to pry information from the 
litigants or their counsel.  In short, all litigants eschewed any desire to 
talk with the news media about this case.199 
In light of First Amendment values and the presumption of openness 
established by the United States Supreme Court, trial judges are expected 
to follow procedures with care before issuing gag orders against trial 
participants.  For example, media in Ohio once objected to a gag order 
that a trial judge had issued without prior notice, without evidence, and 
without a hearing.200  The order, issued before a murder trial, forbade 
“prosecutor’s staff and personnel, including the prosecutor, all defense 
counsel staff and personnel, including both primary defense counsel, and 
all law enforcement agencies and personnel” from making “any extra 
judicial statement by means of public communication other than ‘no 
comment.’”201  The Ohio Supreme Court invalidated the gag order, 
saying: 
[W]e hold that a gag order cannot issue unless “specific, on the record 
findings” are made demonstrating that a gag order is “‘essential to 
preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.’”  
If the interest asserted is the right of the accused to a fair trial, the gag 
order may issue only if “specific findings are made demonstrating that, 
first, there is a substantial probability that the defendant’s right to a fair 
trial will be prejudiced by publicity that . . . [the gag order] would 
prevent and, second, reasonable alternatives . . . cannot adequately 
protect the defendant’s fair trial rights . . . .”  Moreover, 
“representatives of the press and general public ‘must be given an 
opportunity to be heard on the question . . . .’”202 
Federal courts have imposed gag orders against attorneys and other 
trial participants under various standards.  In a 1969 case, the Tenth 
Circuit held that a gag order constitutionally may be “based on a 
                                                          
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. at 1190. 
 200. State ex rel. Nat’l Broad. Co. v. Court of Common Pleas, 556 N.E.2d 1120, 1123–25 (Ohio 
1990), overruled on other grounds by State v. Schlee, 882 N.E.2d 431 (Ohio 2008). 
 201. Id. at 1123. 
 202. Id. at 1125 (citations omitted). 
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‘reasonable likelihood’ of prejudicial news which would make difficult 
the impaneling of an impartial jury and tend to prevent a fair trial.”203  
Some other circuits are more restrictive, permitting a gag order against 
trial participants only if there is a “clear and present danger” or a 
“serious and imminent threat” to fairness of a trial.204 
Despite varying standards, the First Amendment can prevent 
sweeping, judicially imposed restraints on comments by trial 
participants.  For example, a trial judge may try to bar journalists from 
interviewing jurors after a trial has ended.  However, as one court 
concluded, “restrictions on post-trial interviews must reflect an 
impending threat of jury harassment rather than a generalized misgiving 
about the wisdom of such interviews.”205 
The First Amendment may protect pre-trial participants as well.  
When a Florida newspaper reporter was called before a grand jury, a 
state statute generally prohibited grand jury witnesses from ever 
disclosing their testimony.206  The United States Supreme Court, 
however, held that “insofar as the Florida law prohibits a grand jury 
witness from disclosing his own testimony after the term of the grand 
jury has ended, it violates the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.”207 
First Amendment protection may not be available, however, to 
witnesses who seek to disclose information they gained about grand jury 
proceedings in the course of testifying.  In Hoffmann-Pugh v. Keenan, 
the Tenth Circuit supported enforcement of grand jury secrecy rules 
                                                          
 203. United States v. Tijerina, 412 F.2d 661, 666 (10th Cir. 1969).  This case arose when 
authorities accused five individuals of assaulting U.S. forest rangers and other crimes.  United States 
v. Tijerina, 407 F.2d 349, 351 (10th Cir. 1969).  The judge imposed the gag order against the 
defendants, as well as attorneys and witnesses for both sides.  Tijerina, 412 F.2d at 663.  The 
defendants were convicted, and two of them challenged the gag order as violative of the First 
Amendment.  Id. at 666. 
 204. See United States v. Brown, 218 F.3d 415, 426–28 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that a district 
court may “impose an appropriate gag order on parties and/or their lawyers if it determines that 
extrajudicial commentary by those individuals would present a ‘substantial likelihood’ of 
prejudicing the court’s ability to conduct a fair trial”).  The Fifth Circuit reviewed the lack of 
consensus on standards for gag orders against trial participants, noting that the standard embraced in 
the Fourth Circuit is like that in the Tenth Circuit and that “more stringent tests, requiring either a 
showing of ‘clear and present danger’ or ‘serious and imminent threat’ of prejudicing a fair trial” are 
required in the Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits.  Id. at 427.  The Fifth Circuit requires “a lesser 
showing of potential prejudice”: either a “substantial likelihood” or possibly “merely a ‘reasonable 
likelihood’” that extrajudicial comments by participants, including lawyers and parties, “will 
undermine a fair trial.”  Id. at 428.  It may then “impose a gag order on the participants, as long as 
the order is also narrowly tailored and the least restrictive means available.”  Id. 
 205. United States v. Antar, 38 F.3d 1348, 1364 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 206. Butterworth v. Smith, 494 U.S. 624, 626 (1990). 
 207. Id. 
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against an aspiring author.208  The plaintiff was a housekeeper for the 
parents of JonBenet Ramsey, the child whose 1996 murder in Colorado 
attracted extraordinary national attention.209  After the housekeeper 
became involved in a grand jury investigation of the murder, she planned 
to write a book about her experience.210  Colorado grand jury secrecy 
rules did not prevent the housekeeper from disclosing information she 
possessed before her grand jury appearance.211  The secrecy rules 
prohibited her, however, from disclosing matters that she had “learned 
from her participation in the grand jury process, at least so long as the 
potential remains for another grand jury to be called to investigate an 
unsolved murder.”212 
C. The Presumption of Openness 
In a 1981 case, the Kansas Supreme Court faced the question of 
whether a trial judge constitutionally could close a criminal proceeding.  
The case, Kansas City Star Co. v. Fossey, arose when a juvenile who had 
been certified as an adult faced trial for murdering his thirteen-year-old 
stepbrother in Miami County, Kansas.213  After selection of the jury, the 
trial judge, Leighton A. Fossey, acted on his own motion to schedule a 
hearing on whether incriminating statements that the defendant had made 
to the police were involuntary and should be suppressed.214  When Judge 
Fossey indicated in open court that he would exclude the press and 
public from the suppression hearing, a Kansas City Times reporter 
objected by reading a prepared statement.215  She requested that the judge 
hold a hearing on whether to close the courtroom.216  Judge Fossey, 
however, rejected the request, closed the courtroom and conducted the 
suppression hearing.217  He ruled that the defendant’s incriminating 
statements would be admitted into evidence at the trial and that he would 
permit reporters covering the trial to read the defendant’s statements only 
after they were introduced into evidence.218  Judge Fossey’s reasoning 
                                                          
 208. 338 F.3d 1136, 1140 (10th Cir. 2003). 
 209. Id. at 1137. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. at 1140. 
 213. 630 P.2d 1176, 1177 (Kan. 1981). 
 214. Id. at 1178. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. at 1178–79. 
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was that he “did not want the jury exposed to any more publicity than 
necessary.”219 
The Kansas City Star Company, which published the Kansas City 
Times, responded by filing a motion to intervene.220  The Star asked that 
the closure order be vacated and also requested a transcript of the 
suppression hearing.221  Judge Fossey denied the motion to vacate, yet 
ruled that the Star could receive a copy of the transcript from a court 
reporter.222  The murder trial went forward and resulted in a guilty 
verdict, but the Star filed a mandamus action with the Kansas Supreme 
Court, challenging Judge Fossey’s closure of the suppression hearing.223   
Even though the hearing had occurred after the jury was impaneled, 
the Kansas Supreme Court chose to view it as a pre-trial proceeding and 
consequently found Richmond Newspapers inapplicable.224  Instead, the 
court relied on DePasquale and upheld the closure of the hearing, saying 
such action is justified when “necessary to insure a fair trial for the 
defendant.”225 
As for the future, however, the court announced that a trial judge 
may close a pre-trial criminal proceeding “‘only if (i) the dissemination 
of information from the pretrial proceeding and its record would create a 
clear and present danger to the fairness of the trial, and (ii) the prejudicial 
effect of such information on trial fairness cannot be avoided by any 
reasonable alternative means.’”226 
The court derived its two-part test from standards for the conduct of 
criminal proceedings that the ABA approved in 1978, which replaced the 
standards the organization had first published in 1968.227  The 1978 
standards were more favorable to First Amendment interests than the 
original and tended to be consistent with the United States Supreme 
Court’s holding in Richmond Newspapers.  The standards called for “a 
strong presumption in favor of open judicial proceedings.”228  The 
standards did not limit the general principle of openness to pre-trial 
proceedings; rather, openness extended “to every phase of judicial 
                                                          
 219. Id. at 1179. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id.  The Kansas Supreme Court declined to rule that the issue was moot, finding that it was 
capable of repetition.  Id. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. at 1180–81. 
 226. Id. at 1182 (quoting ABA STANDARDS 2d ed., supra note 45, at § 8-3.2). 
 227. See ABA STANDARDS 2d ed., supra note 45. 
 228. Fossey, 630 P.2d at 1182. 
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proceedings in a criminal case.”229  As the Kansas Supreme Court 
acknowledged in Fossey: 
 In recent years, there has been a great deal of discussion on the 
subject of “fair trial and free press” and the right of the public and news 
media to attend court proceedings.  There is almost universal agreement 
among the courts and writers who have considered the issue that access 
to court proceedings should be limited only in exceptional 
circumstances.  It has been said that the reason for requiring all court 
proceedings to be open, except where extraordinary reasons for closure 
are present, . . . is to enhance the public trust and confidence in the 
judicial process and to insulate the process against attempts to use the 
courts as tools for persecution.230 
The public interest in access to courts, according to the Kansas 
Supreme Court, “‘is at least as strong as the first amendment policy 
against prior restraints.’”231  Before restricting access, a trial judge must 
conduct a hearing and 
make findings and state for the record the evidence upon which the 
court relied and the factors which the court considered in arriving at its 
decision.  Such a procedure will protect both the right of the defendant 
to a fair trial and the right of the public and news media to have access 
to court proceedings.232 
The Fossey decision explicitly applied the presumption of openness 
to any pre-trial proceeding, including a bail hearing.233  In addition, 
because of Fossey’s implicit endorsement of court access generally and 
because of other precedents, most other proceedings—ranging from voir 
dire234 to expungement hearings235—are presumptively open in Kansas. 
In 2005, the Kansas Supreme Court again reviewed the limitations 
on judges’ authority to close court proceedings.  A defendant had been 
convicted of two murders and other charges in connection with an 
                                                          
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. at 1181. 
 231. Id. at 1183 (citations omitted). 
 232. Id. at 1184. 
 233. Id. at 1182. 
 234. See State v. Dixon, 112 P.3d 883, 907 (Kan. 2005) (citing Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. 501, 
513 (1984) (holding that voir dire is presumed to be open, and noting that “[t]he judge at this trial 
closed an incredible six weeks of voir dire without considering alternatives to closure”)). 
 235. Stephens v. Van Arsdale, 608 P.2d 972, 985 (Kan. 1980) (“The public or press are free to 
attend the original trial or the sentencing hearing or any post-judgment hearings or the expungement 
proceeding itself.”). 
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explosion and fire at an apartment building.236  The trial judge closed the 
courtroom to the media and spectators during an announcement of the 
jury’s verdict.237  The purpose of the closure was to prevent news of the 
verdict from reaching jurors who had been selected to sit in a pending, 
related criminal case.238 
In State v. Dixon, the Kansas Supreme Court indicated that the 
process by which the trial judge had decided to close the proceeding 
complied with Press-Enterprise I, observing that “the trial court went to 
great lengths to articulate the interest to be served by closure as well as 
its findings on reasonable alternative means.”239  Nevertheless, after 
taking Waller into account, the court concluded that closure of court 
proceedings must be consistent with both the First and Sixth 
amendments.240  As was explained in Dixon: 
 Here, the trial court considered the advocated interests and the 
alternatives. The trial court exercised care in striking a balance of those 
interests.  But the court’s decision was made in response to intervention 
by area newspapers, whose interests were the First Amendment 
interests of media freedom.  Although defense counsel made a simple 
statement of objection to closing the courtroom, the Sixth Amendment 
interest in a public trial seems not to have been pressed.  [I]t was [the 
defendant’s] right to a public trial that is at issue here.241 
The closure, the court held, “was inconsistent with the substantial right 
of Dixon to a public trial and not harmless error.”242 
Access to post-trial proceedings, including plea hearings, generally 
has been presumed throughout the United States in light of such 
precedents as Press-Enterprise II.  For example, in 1986, in In re 
Washington Post Co., the Fourth Circuit addressed whether the media 
and the public have a First Amendment right of access to hearings on 
sentencing, as well as pleas.243  The conclusion was in favor of openness: 
Sentencing can occur before the termination of the trial proceeding, 
and, even if it occurs in a separate hearing, it clearly amounts to the 
culmination of the trial.  Moreover, even if plea hearings and 
sentencing hearings are not considered a part of the trial itself, they are 
                                                          
 236. Dixon, 112 P.3d at 889. 
 237. Id. at 906. 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. at 908. 
 240. Id. at 910–11. 
 241. Id. at 910. 
 242. Id. 
 243. See 807 F.2d 383 (4th Cir. 1986). 
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surely as much an integral part of a criminal prosecution as are 
preliminary probable-cause hearings, suppression hearings, or bail 
hearings, all of which have been held to be subject to the public’s First 
Amendment right of access. 
 In addition, historical and functional considerations weigh in favor 
of finding a First Amendment right of access here.  Sentencings have 
historically been open to the public; while plea hearings do not have the 
same long tradition, they are typically held in open court.  As to both, 
public access serves the important function of discouraging either the 
prosecutor or the court from engaging in arbitrary or wrongful conduct. 
The presence of the public operates to check any temptation that might 
be felt by either the prosecutor or the court to obtain a guilty plea by 
coercion or trick, or to seek or impose an arbitrary or disproportionate 
sentence.244 
D. Juvenile Court Proceedings 
1. Kansas Juvenile Justice 
Access to juvenile court proceedings is governed by different 
standards, although they may not be as restrictive as one may expect.  A 
revised Kansas juvenile code provides that, in general, “[a]ll hearings 
shall be open to the public . . . .”245  A hearing may be closed only if a 
judge determines that opening it “is not in the best interests of the victim 
or of any juvenile who at the time of the alleged offense was less than 16 
years of age.”246 
In an interpretation of a previous version of the juvenile code, the 
Kansas Supreme Court distinguished between adjudicatory and detention 
hearings, and upheld closure of the latter kind of hearing.247  Under the 
revised juvenile code, however, the rule in favor of openness applies to 
“detention, first appearance, adjudicatory, sentencing and all other” 
juvenile hearings.248 
In a 2008 case, the Kansas Supreme Court observed that the 
Legislature generally had “eliminated the presumption of confidentiality” 
                                                          
 244. Id. at 389. 
 245. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2353(a) (Supp. 2008). 
 246. Id. 
 247. See Stauffer Commc’ns, Inc. v. Mitchell, 789 P.2d 1153, 1157 (Kan. 1990). 
 248. § 38-2353(c).  If a hearing is open, the court may still order that witnesses be sequestered.  
Id.  If a hearing is closed, persons who may be present are limited to the juvenile, the juvenile’s 
parents, attorneys for parties, officers of the court, the witness testifying, and the victim or the 
victim’s family.  Id. at § 38-2353(b).  Others may be present by agreement of the parties, unless 
there is a risk of disruption to the proceedings.  Id. 
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for juvenile hearings, and also acknowledged various ways in which 
juvenile records have been opened.249  Under the revised juvenile code, 
the official file in a juvenile case is open, with an exception for juveniles 
under the age of fourteen if a judge finds that closure is in their best 
interests.250  Also, law enforcement records and municipal court records 
for juveniles age fourteen and over are open on the same terms as records 
for adults.251  Confidentiality applies only to the law enforcement and 
municipal records of juveniles under the age of fourteen.252 
The revised juvenile code makes clear that a judge may close a 
hearing only after he or she “determines” that an open hearing would not 
be in the best interest of a juvenile or victim who was under sixteen years 
of age at the time of the offense.253  Under federal and Kansas 
precedents, a presumption of openness generally may be overcome only 
if a judge formally takes into account evidence for or against closure 
from interested parties and makes specific findings that can be reviewed 
on appeal.  As the United States Supreme Court has held, closure must 
be based on “findings specific enough that a reviewing court can 
determine whether the closure order was properly entered.”254 
In interpreting past versions of the Kansas juvenile code, state 
appellate courts have considered the conditions under which findings by 
a judge are sufficiently specific.  For example, in Pauley v. Gross, a 
juvenile defendant appealed an order that he be detained without bail 
after arrest.255  The reviewing court approvingly noted that the order had 
been issued by a judge who, “after notice and hearing, made specific 
findings including the essential ones.”256  In In re Reed, a mother 
challenged a judge’s finding that she was “unfit” as a parent.257  The 
reviewing court said “substantial competent evidence” was necessary to 
support such a finding258 and held that a hearing in the lower court had 
been “rather informally” conducted and was inadequate.259 
                                                          
 249. In re L.M., 186 P.3d 164, 170 (Kan. 2008) (citing § 38-2353). 
 250. Id. (citing § 38-2309(b)). 
 251. Id. (citing § 38-2310(c)). 
 252. Id. (citing § 38-2310(a)). 
 253. § 38-2353(a). 
 254. Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984). 
 255. 574 P.2d 234, 235 (Kan. Ct. App. 1977). 
 256. Id. at 240. 
 257. 663 P.2d 675, 675 (Kan. Ct. App. 1983). 
 258. Id. at 678. 
 259. Id. at 680. 
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2. Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act 
Case-by-case decisions may be made under federal law on whether 
juvenile proceedings should be open or closed.  The Third Circuit set a 
significant precedent in deciding whether proceedings should be open 
under the federal Juvenile Delinquency Act.260  The issue arose after 
federal authorities took action in the early 1990s against juveniles who 
had been arrested in connection with gang-related crimes in 
Pennsylvania.261  The media requested access, and the Third Circuit 
decided that the delinquency act does not mandate closure of 
proceedings.262  Holding that district judges could open or close 
proceedings on a case-by-case basis, the Third Circuit said: 
 We, like the government, recognize the need to avoid embarrassing 
and humiliating juveniles, to obtain evidence about delicate matters, 
and not to affect the rehabilitation of juveniles adversely.  We are not 
convinced, however, that Congress found across-the-board closure of 
juvenile proceedings necessary to achieve these goals.  Rather, we 
think Congress left the delicate task of weighing the interests of the 
juvenile and the public to the informed discretion of the district judge 
in each case.  District judges are experienced at striking this kind of 
delicate balance in the first instance in the context of common law and 
other First Amendment access cases.263 
E. Closed Criminal Proceedings 
In various jurisdictions across the United States, the media have 
unsuccessfully sought access to various criminal proceedings, including 
grand jury deliberations. 
1. Grand Juries 
In Kansas, media access to grand juries has not surfaced as a 
controversial issue in the state’s courts.  Because of the value historically 
placed on the secrecy of grand juries, however, courts elsewhere have 
denied access to grand jury deliberations.  For example, newspapers were 
prevented from gaining access to a grand jury investigation of the 
                                                          
 260. See United States v. A.D., 28 F.3d 1353 (3d Cir. 1994) (interpreting 18 U.S.C. §§ 5031–
5042 (2006)). 
 261. Id. at 1355. 
 262. Id. at 1359. 
 263. Id. at 1361. 
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University of Florida Athletic Program in 1988.264  The Eleventh Circuit 
said that opening the grand jury investigation to public view would 
frustrate it, in “direct contrast to the advantages public access provides” 
to criminal trials.265 
When considering the conditions under which courts may provide 
information about grand jury investigations to civil litigants, the United 
States Supreme Court in 1979 reviewed the reasons for grand jury 
secrecy.266  Without secrecy, witnesses would hesitate to testify when 
subpoenaed and would flee or, upon becoming known, be subject to 
undue influence.267  Other reasons cited for keeping grand jury 
deliberations secret included preventing public embarrassment of persons 
who are accused and investigated but not indicted.268 
2. Inquisitions 
In Kansas, the attorney general’s office and county and district 
attorneys may conduct inquisitions to investigate “any alleged violation 
of the laws.”269  The purpose of an inquisition may be either to determine 
probable cause for a criminal prosecution or to gain sworn testimony 
following an indictment.270  An inquisition, according to the Kansas 
Supreme Court, is like a “one-person grand jury” and may be closed.271 
3. Bench Conferences 
Typically, media can do no more than observe when attorneys for the 
prosecution and defense confer privately with a judge at the bench or in 
chambers.  Even if such a conference may be newsworthy, reporters 
likely will be unsuccessful if they seek access, as was indicated in a 1990 
federal case in Georgia.  In that case, United States v. Moody, reporters 
attended a hearing to determine whether a couple who were charged with 
                                                          
 264. In re Subpoena to Testify Before Grand Jury Directed to Custodian of Records, 864 F.2d 
1559, 1561 (11th Cir. 1989). 
 265. Id. at 1562. 
 266. Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Nw., 441 U.S. 211, 218–19 (1979). 
 267. Id. at 219. 
 268. Id. 
 269. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3101(1) (2007); State v. Cathey, 741 P.2d 738, 744 (Kan. 1987). 
 270. In re T.H., 932 P.2d 1023, 1027 (Kan. Ct. App. 1997).  The Kansas Court of Appeals held 
that an inquisition was properly closed to the public because it “dealt with confidential and family 
matters.”  Id. at 1033. 
 271. Cathey, 741 P.2d at 744. 
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obstruction of justice should be detained or released on bond.272  The 
couple had allegedly arranged for false testimony to be given in 
connection with a 1972 case involving a pipe bomb.273  After the 
detention hearing, the judge called on the attorneys to meet with him in 
chambers.274  The judge planned to hear defense objections to a 
prosecution plan to show that the couple were linked to two fatal mail 
bombings in 1989.275  When reporters made a request for access to the 
conference, the judge denied it.276  He said that his meeting with counsel 
in chambers did not meet the conditions for openness that the United 
States Supreme Court set in Press-Enterprise II.277  Such a conference, 
he said, has not been open historically, and opening it would not have a 
positive effect, particularly when doing so would result in publicity about 
inadmissible evidence.278  Even so, the media occasionally have pressed 
with some success for access to bench or sidebar conferences or other 
proceedings conducted out of the presence of the jury.279 
4. Jury Deliberations 
In the early 1930s, the United States Supreme Court reviewed why 
jury deliberations have historically been secret.  In Clark v. United 
States, a member of a jury in a criminal case had been found in contempt, 
because she had falsely represented her qualifications for jury service.280  
On appeal, she objected that her contempt conviction had been based in 
part on testimony by other jurors about her conduct during the jury’s 
deliberations.281  She argued that the other jurors’ testimony should not 
have been allowed, because the jury’s deliberations were privileged and 
                                                          
 272. 746 F. Supp. 1090, 1091 (M.D. Ga. 1990). 
 273. Gail Epstein, Judge Denies Moody Bond—Calls Him Danger to Other Persons, ATLANTA 
J. & CONST., July 14, 1990, at C1. 
 274. Moody, 746 F. Supp. at 1091. 
 275. Id. 
 276. Id. 
 277. Id. at 1092. 
 278. Id. 
 279. See, e.g., United States v. Simone, 14 F.3d 833, 835 (3d Cir. 1994) (regarding in camera 
examinations of jurors for possible exposure to prejudicial publicity); United States v. Smith, 787 
F.2d 111, 112 (3d Cir. 1986) (concerning access to transcripts to sidebar and bench conferences); 
Capital Newspapers Group of Hearst Corp. v. Brown, 429 N.Y.S.2d 749, 750–51 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1980) (objection to closed hearing following a bench conference); Houston Chronicle Publ’g Co. v. 
Shaver, 630 S.W.2d 927, 929–30 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (media challenge to judge’s consideration, 
in chambers, of voluntariness of a confession). 
 280. 289 U.S. 1, 6 (1933). 
 281. Id. at 13–14. 
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should have remained secret.282  In rejecting the juror’s argument, the 
Court held that the privilege for jury deliberations did not apply to one 
who had acted fraudulently.283  In the absence of fraud by a juror, 
however, the Court said that deliberations would be privileged and kept 
secret to protect jurors’ “[f]reedom of debate” and “independence of 
thought.”284 
Nevertheless, the media have shown interest in gaining access to jury 
deliberations.  In 2002, the Public Broadcasting Service’s Frontline news 
program obtained permission from a trial judge to videotape a capital 
murder trial in Texas, including deliberations by the jury.285  Frontline’s 
plan was to broadcast the video after the trial.286 
A Texas appellate court intervened, however, ruling that the order 
permitting Frontline to videotape the jury deliberations violated a statute 
that said “[n]o person shall be permitted to be with a jury while it is 
deliberating.”287  Dissenting, one of the appellate judges said: 
 The question in this case is whether allowing a camera in the jury 
room to record the jury while it is deliberating violates the statute’s 
proscription against a “person” being with the jury.  The majority 
concludes that “each of the millions of viewers of the videotape is a 
person” and that “the playing of the videotape (live or not) permits 
these persons to ‘be with the jury while it is deliberating’.”  But this is 
simply not the case.  While each viewer is indeed a person, the viewers 
will not be with the jury while the jury is deliberating.  Instead, the 
viewers will be viewing the jury long after the jury has deliberated.288 
5. Anonymous Juries 
Even when presiding over a trial that is open, the judge may shield 
the jurors from public scrutiny by keeping their identities secret.  
Anonymous juries are requested in organized crime cases and in trials of 
terrorists.289  As has been reported, “[h]istorically, these are cases in 
                                                          
 282. Id. 
 283. Id. at 14–15. 
 284. Id. at 13. 
 285. University of Texas at Austin School of Law, Court Hearing: UT-Austin to Host Oral 
Arguments in Cameras in Courtrooms Case, Jan. 10, 2003, http://www.utexas.edu/law/news/2003/ 
011003_arguments.html. 
 286. Id. 
 287. State ex rel. Rosenthal v. Poe, 98 S.W.3d 194, 200 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (quoting TEX. 
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.22 (Vernon 2006)). 
 288. Id. at 223 (Keasler, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
 289. Corinna Zarek, Trying Blind: Secret Juries Continue Hearing Major Cases, NEWS MEDIA 
& L., Fall 2007, at 23, available at http://www.rcfp.org/newsitems/index.php?i=6459. 
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which a court is concerned about jury tampering and juror safety, fearing 
threats and retribution against jurors.”290 
The Kansas Supreme Court has prescribed when a trial judge may 
grant anonymity to jurors in criminal trials: 
 Empaneling an anonymous jury is viewed as a drastic measure 
which should be undertaken only under certain limited circumstances.  
The trial court must balance the need to ensure juror safety against the 
defendant’s right to the presumption of innocence and the ability to 
conduct an effective voir dire.  This balancing test is met where (1) 
there is strong reason to believe the jury needs protection and (2) the 
court takes reasonable precautions to minimize any prejudicial effects 
on the defendant and to ensure his or her fundamental rights are 
protected.291 
The court noted that states generally follow federal practice in 
requiring that a jury be anonymous only for “a compelling reason.”292  
The court said a finding that a jury needs protection may be based on the 
following factors: 
(1) the defendants’ involvement in organized crime; (2) the defendants’ 
participation in a group with the capacity to harm jurors; (3) the 
defendants’ past attempts to interfere with the judicial process or 
witnesses; (4) the potential that, if convicted, the defendants will suffer 
a lengthy incarceration and substantial monetary penalties; and, (5) 
extensive publicity that could enhance the possibility that jurors’ names 
would become public and expose them to intimidation and 
harassment.293 
F. Access to Civil Proceedings 
1. Presumed Open 
In Richmond Newspapers, the United States Supreme Court observed 
“that historically both civil and criminal trials have been presumptively 
open.”294  Since then, lower courts have held that civil trials should be no 
less accessible to the press and public than criminal proceedings.  For 
example, in Publicker Industries, Inc. v. Cohen, the Third Circuit said 
that “the civil trial, like the criminal trial, ‘plays a particularly significant 
                                                          
 290. Id. 
 291. State v. Brown, 118 P.3d 1273, 1279 (Kan. 2005) (citations omitted). 
 292. Id. 
 293. Id. (citation omitted). 
 294. Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 n.17 (1980). 
7.0_KAUTSCH FINAL 4/22/2009  7:58:57 AM 
1112 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57 
role in the functioning of the judicial process and the government as a 
whole.’”295  Other points made in Publicker included these: 
● “[P]ublic access to civil trials ‘enhances the quality and 
safeguards the integrity of the factfinding process.’”296 
● Openness is associated with fairness and “heightens ‘public 
respect for the judicial process.’”297 
● Access to civil proceedings “‘permits the public to participate 
in and serve as a check upon the judicial process—an essential 
component in our structure of self-government.’”298 
● “Public access to civil trials, no less than criminal trials, plays 
an important role in the participation and the free discussion of 
governmental affairs.”299 
In Kansas, state courts have focused on access to criminal matters, 
although a federal court in the state has ruled in favor of open civil 
proceedings.  A defendant in Mike v. Dymon, Inc. allegedly breached an 
employment contract by making an unauthorized disclosure about a 
business.300  The defendant, without objection from the plaintiff, asked 
that the courtroom proceedings “be closed to unauthorized personnel 
during presentation or discussion of ‘competitive confidential’ or 
‘confidential’ information.”301  In rejecting the request for closure, the 
judge recognized “that members of the public possess both a common 
law and First Amendment right of access to civil trials.”302  One cited 
precedent said: 
[W]hat happens in the halls of government is presumptively open to 
public scrutiny.  Judges deliberate in private but issue public decisions 
after public arguments based on public records.  The political branches 
of government claim legitimacy by election, judges by reason.  Any 
step that withdraws an element of the judicial process from public view 
makes the ensuing decision look more like fiat; this requires rigorous 
justification.303 
                                                          
 295. 733 F.2d 1059, 1070 (3d Cir. 1984) (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 
U.S. 596, 606 (1982)) (reversing a trial judge’s denial of media access to civil proceedings in a 
stockholder dispute). 
 296. Id. (quoting Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606). 
 297. Id. (quoting Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606). 
 298. Id. (quoting Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606). 
 299. Id. 
 300. No. 95-2405-EEO, 1997 WL 38111, at *1 (D. Kan. Jan. 23, 1997). 
 301. Id. 
 302. Id. (citing Publicker, 733 F.2d at 1066–71). 
 303. In re Krynicki, 983 F.2d 74, 75 (7th Cir. 1992). 
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2. Selected Issues 
a. Discovery 
A civil case may attract news media attention, particularly if it 
involves serious allegations or the litigants are prominent.  In such a 
case, the media may seek access to pre-trial discovery proceedings.  In 
New York, for example, Newsday once sought to attend depositions 
during a wrongful death action against a hospital.304  The case focused on 
a hospital employee who had been convicted of murder after being 
accused of improperly administering a drug to patients.305  In Scollo v. 
Good Samaritan Hospital, a New York appellate court recognized that 
the presumption of openness in Press-Enterprise II applied to civil 
proceedings, but ruled that Newsday was not entitled to attend the 
depositions.306 
The decision in Scollo was based on a 1994 United States Supreme 
Court decision.307  In that decision, Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, a 
religious organization had sued the Seattle Times newspaper and others, 
alleging that they had published defamatory articles.308  After the lawsuit 
was filed, the trial judge ordered the newspaper not to make public 
certain information that the paper could gain about the plaintiff before 
trial through the discovery process.309  The newspaper was permitted to 
use the information from discovery only to defend itself in the course of 
litigation.310 
The Court upheld the restriction on the newspaper, observing that the 
judge’s order did not prohibit the paper from publishing information that 
it gained by means other than discovery and that the judge had issued the 
order “to avoid the ‘chilling effect’ that dissemination would have on ‘a 
party’s willingness to bring his case to court.’”311  The Court went on to 
say: 
 
                                                          
 304. Scollo v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 572 N.Y.S.2d 730, 731 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991). 
 305. Id. 
 306. Id. at 732 (finding that discovery was not the kind of proceeding that had “‘historically been 
open to the press and general public’” and in which “‘public access plays a significant positive role 
in the functioning’” of the process (quoting Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986))). 
 307. See id. 
 308. 467 U.S. 20, 22 (1984). 
 309. Id. at 27. 
 310. Id. 
 311. Id. 
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[P]retrial depositions and interrogatories are not public components of a 
civil trial.  Such proceedings were not open to the public at common 
law, and, in general, they are conducted in private as a matter of 
modern practice.  Much of the information that surfaces during pretrial 
discovery may be unrelated, or only tangentially related, to the 
underlying cause of action.  Therefore, restraints placed on discovered, 
but not yet admitted, information are not a restriction on a traditionally 
public source of information.312 
b. Bankruptcy 
A debtor in a 1987 bankruptcy proceeding tried to keep a Baltimore 
Sun reporter from attending a creditors’ meeting, arguing that the 
meeting was like discovery and should be kept private.313  A U.S. District 
Court reviewed the case and said reasons for barring a reporter from a 
creditors’ meeting could be “a concern (1) that the debtor would be less 
forthcoming regarding his financial situation in the presence of the press; 
and (2) that the presence of noninterested parties might interfere with the 
orderly administration of the proceedings.”314  Nevertheless, the holding 
was that a creditors’ meeting should be accessible to the media and the 
public.315  The court said: 
[W]hile both discovery and a creditors’ meeting are primarily 
concerned with obtaining information, the two proceedings have much 
different historical backgrounds.  Discovery is a pretrial process 
conducted principally by the parties with varying degrees of court 
supervision; a creditors’ meeting is a formal part of a Chapter 7 
bankruptcy, mandated by [statute], supervised by a court clerk, and a 
proceeding at which substantive rights of creditors are often affected.316 
The court also said that, in light of the history and law of bankruptcy, 
a creditors’ meeting is presumptively open “unless, in a given case, there 
is a showing that a restriction of access ‘is essential to preserve higher 
values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.’”317 
                                                          
 312. Id. at 33 (citations omitted). 
 313. In re Astri Inv., Mgmt. & Sec. Corp., 88 B.R. 730, 732 (D. Md. 1988). 
 314. Id. at 741. 
 315. Id. 
 316. Id. at 736. 
 317. Id. at 741 (quoting Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984)). 
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IV. OPENNESS OF COURT RECORDS 
A. Protection for Truthful Publication 
A Kansas statute prohibits public disclosure of a search or arrest 
warrant without authorization from law enforcement. 318  In 1979, the 
Kansas Supreme Court considered whether the statute could be enforced 
against a newspaper after it identified persons for whom authorities had 
issued arrest warrants.319  After the paper disclosed the names, the 
authorities were unable to locate one of the persons and found the other 
only several weeks later out of state.320  The newspaper was convicted of 
violating the non-disclosure statute.321  In State v. Stauffer 
Communications, however, the Kansas Supreme Court reversed the 
conviction.322  The newspaper, the Topeka Daily Capital, had learned 
about the warrants by monitoring the police radio, and a reporter verified 
the names by checking a criminal appearance docket in the office of the 
clerk of the district court.323  She had gained access to the appearance 
docket by following the general practice for reporters, which was to walk 
past a counter in the office and through a gate to a table at the back of the 
room.324  There, they could view the appearance docket, a public record 
kept by the clerk of the district court.325  The court held: 
 The First Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 
11 of the Bill of Rights of the Kansas Constitution forbid the 
imposition of criminal sanctions for truthful reporting of facts gleaned 
from public records.  By placing information in the official public 
records the state has thereby released the information to the public and 
has placed it in the public domain.326 
The holding in Stauffer was in accord with a line of precedents that 
protect truthful reporting of information gained in open court or gleaned 
from public records.  As was stated in one case, “‘[a] trial is a public 
event.  What transpires in the court room is public property. . . .  Those 
                                                          
 318. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3827 (2007). 
 319. State v. Stauffer Commc’ns, 592 P.2d 891, 892 (Kan. 1979). 
 320. Id. at 893. 
 321. Id. at 892. 
 322. Id. at 897. 
 323. Id. at 893. 
 324. Id. 
 325. Id. 
 326. Id. at 894–95. 
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who see and hear what transpired can report it with impunity.’”327  In 
another, the United States Supreme Court said: 
 As a general matter, “state action to punish the publication of 
truthful information seldom can satisfy constitutional standards.”  More 
specifically, this Court has repeatedly held that “if a newspaper 
lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of public 
significance then state officials may not constitutionally punish 
publication of the information, absent a need . . . of the highest 
order.”328 
B. Access and the Common Law 
A common law right of access to court records has been recognized 
in support of “the citizen’s desire to keep a watchful eye on the workings 
of public agencies and in a newspaper publisher’s intention to publish 
information concerning the operation of government.”329  Under the 
common law, however, a judge has discretion to deny access to court 
records if they could become “a vehicle for improper purposes.”330 
The Kansas Supreme Court has concluded that such improper 
purposes include use of records “‘to gratify private spite or promote 
public scandal’ through the publication of the details of a divorce case or 
for the publication of libelous statements for press consumption, or as 
sources of business information that might harm a litigant’s competitive 
standing.”331 
C. Statutory Right of Access 
The United States Supreme Court has observed that, in many 
jurisdictions, the common law right of access to court records “has been 
recognized or expanded by statute.”332  To the extent that the Kansas 
Legislature has codified common law access, it has done so principally 
through the Kansas Open Records Act.333  The Legislature declared that 
                                                          
 327. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 492 (1975) (emphasis added) (quoting Craig v. 
Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947)). 
 328. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 527–28 (2001) (citing Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 
443 U.S. 97, 102 (1979)); see also Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 550 (1989); Landmark 
Commc’ns, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 842 (1978). 
 329. Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978). 
 330. Id. 
 331. Stephens v. Van Arsdale, 608 P.2d 972, 982 (1980) (quoting Warner Commc’ns, 435 U.S. 
at 598). 
 332. Warner Commc’ns, 435 U.S. at 598 n.7. 
 333. See KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-215 to 45-223 (2000 & Supp. 2008). 
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openness of public records is presumed,334 and made the law applicable 
to any “public agency,” including any “entity receiving or expending and 
supported in whole or in part by the public funds appropriated by the 
state.”335 
The Open Records Act, however, also provides that a public agency 
“shall not be required to disclose” certain records, such as those closed 
by supreme court rule.336  The Kansas Supreme Court has exercised its 
authority by issuing an order providing for “Administration of the 
Kansas Open Records Act.”337 
The Kansas Judicial Branch has reported on its website that open 
court records include “case files and transcripts” and “[f]inal civil and 
criminal judgments.”338  The Judicial Branch also has made clear that 
some records are not accessible “pursuant to judicial order or caselaw” 
and that the Open Records Act “recognizes that some records contain 
information that is private in nature.”339 
Judges’ records are an example of records that are exempt from 
public inspection under the Open Records Act.  The exemption excludes 
“any municipal judge, judge of the district court, judge of the court of 
appeals or justice of the supreme court” from the requirement that public 
agencies must make their records available.340  Long distance telephone 
records of judges are an example of the kind that are considered 
exempt.341 
Judges, however, must make an annual public disclosure of certain 
personal financial matters under a Kansas Supreme Court rule.342 
                                                          
 334. Id. § 45-216(a). 
 335. Id. § 45-217(f)(1). 
 336. Id. § 45-221(a)(1). 
 337. Order regarding Administration of the Kansas Open Records Act, Kan. Order No. 156, 
available at http://www.kscourts.org/Kansas-courts/supreme-court/administrative-orders/Admin-
order-156.pdf. 
 338. Kansas Judicial Branch Appellate Clerk, Open Records Act, http://www.kscourts.org/ 
appellate-clerk/general/open-records-act/default.asp (last visited Apr. 21, 2009). 
 339. Id. 
 340. § 45-217(f)(2)(B). 
 341. Op. Kan. Att’y Gen. No. 96-77 (Sept. 12, 1996).  The Kansas Attorney General considered 
whether a citizen was entitled to inspect long distance telephone records of district court judges 
when the phone records were held by a county data processing department.  The Attorney General 
opined that the county data processing department was “merely acting as a contractor or agent for 
the district court judges.  The records were created by judges and remain records of the judges, 
exempt from the KORA.”  Id. 
 342. KAN. SUP. CT. R. 601A, Canon 4H(7). 
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D. Access to Records and the First Amendment 
1. Standard Adopted in Fossey 
In 1980, the Kansas Supreme Court declared that access to court 
records was governed by common law, not the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments.343  A year later in Fossey,344 however, the Kansas Supreme 
Court took a more favorable view of the First Amendment’s application 
to court records.  According to Fossey, “‘The public interest in open 
proceedings and free access to courts in a criminal case is at least as 
strong as the first amendment policy against prior restraints.’”345  The 
1976 landmark First Amendment precedent, Nebraska Press,346 was the 
basis for the standard that the Kansas Supreme Court adopted on court 
access in Fossey.347  The standard states that a motion to seal a court 
record may be granted only when a judge finds that: 1) “the 
dissemination of information from the . . . record would create a clear 
and present danger to the fairness of the trial,” and 2) “the prejudicial 
effect of such information on trial fairness cannot be avoided by any 
reasonable alternative means.”348 
The standard also requires that a “complete record” be kept of any 
pre-trial proceeding that a judge conducts in a closed courtroom or in 
chambers because of a clear and present danger of unfairness.  The 
record of the closed proceeding must be “made available to the public 
following the completion of trial or earlier if consistent with trial 
fairness.”349 
2. Federal Courts 
A First Amendment right of access to records has been claimed with 
some success in federal courts.350  They include the Tenth Circuit, 
                                                          
 343. Stephens v. Van Arsdale, 608 P.2d 972, 980 (Kan. 1980). 
 344. 630 P.2d 1176 (Kan. 1981). 
 345. Id. at 1183 (citing ABA STANDARDS 3d ed., supra note 46). 
 346. 427 U.S. 539 (1976). 
 347. Fossey, 630 P.2d at 1183. 
 348. Id. at 1182 (citing ABA STANDARDS 3d ed., supra note 46). 
 349. Id. 
 350. See, e.g., Hartford Courant Co. v. Pellegrino, 380 F.3d 83, 96 (2d Cir. 2004) (regarding 
docket sheets); Gambale v. Deutsche Bank AG, 377 F.3d 133, 140 n.4 (2d Cir. 2004); Republic of 
Philippines v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 949 F.2d 653, 659 (3d Cir. 1991) (records of civil 
proceedings); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1177 (6th Cir. 1983) 
(court documents). 
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although it only recognized a First Amendment access right in a limited 
way.  A district judge in Colorado had sealed records in connection with 
the criminal proceedings that followed the 1995 bombing of the Murrah 
Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.  In United States v. 
McVeigh, the Tenth Circuit noted that, under the common law, court 
records “are presumptively available to the public, but may be sealed if 
the right to access is outweighed by the interests favoring 
nondisclosure.”351  The common law, it also was noted, provides that a 
judge’s decision to seal records may be reviewed for abuse of 
discretion.352 
Before sealing the records in the Oklahoma City bombing case, 
however, the Colorado district judge had applied a First Amendment 
standard rather than the common law.  The Tenth Circuit observed that, 
in a number of other federal courts, “the logic of Press-Enterprise II 
extends to at least some categories of court documents and records, such 
that the First Amendment balancing test there articulated should be 
applied before such qualifying documents and records can be sealed.”353  
The court declined to hold that the media generally have a First 
Amendment-based right of access to court records.354  Nevertheless, in its 
review of the media’s request for records in the Oklahoma City bombing 
case, the court assumed that access in that specific case was “governed 
by the analysis articulated in Press-Enterprise II.”355  The court 
explained: 
 In determining whether a particular type of document is included 
within the First Amendment right of access, courts engage in a two-
pronged inquiry in which they ask: (1) whether the document is one 
which has historically been open to inspection by the press and the 
public; and (2) “whether public access plays a significant positive role 
in the functioning of the particular process in question.”  This two-part 
inquiry is referred to as the test of “experience and logic.” 
 If the qualified First Amendment right of access is found to apply to 
the documents under the “experience and logic” test, [a] court may then 
seal the documents only if “closure is essential to preserve higher 
values and is necessary to serve that interest.”356 
                                                          
 351. 119 F.3d 806, 811 (10th Cir. 1997) (citing Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 
602 (1978)). 
 352. Id. 
 353. Id. 
 354. Id. at 812, 814. 
 355. Id. at 812. 
 356. Id. at 812–13. 
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The court upheld the district judge’s sealing of the records, 
concluding that when records are closed to the extent permissible under 
the First Amendment, the closure necessarily also satisfies the common 
law standard.357 
E. Legislation Regarding Sealed Records 
In 2008, the Kansas Legislature enacted a law that requires state 
courts to conduct a hearing before they seal records or close a 
proceeding.358  The law requires judges to specify their reasons for 
denying access to proceedings or records and base their decision on an 
“identified safety, property or privacy interest.”359  In proposing the law, 
which originated as House Bill 2825, the sponsor acted in “response to 
concerns regarding the practice of the Kansas Supreme [Court] closing 
proceedings in certain high profile cases.”360 
F. Certain Types of Criminal Records 
1. Warrants and Supporting Affidavits 
a. Access Sought in Kansas 
Kansas media have objected to limitations that state laws impose on 
access to information about arrest and search warrants.  One statute 
recognizes the authority of government officials to control the release of 
information about warrant applications and execution of warrants.361  
                                                          
 357. Id. at 812. 
 358. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-2617 (Supp. 2008). 
 359. Id. § 60-2617(d). 
 360. Lance Kinzer, Legislative Update—April 15, 2008, http://www.lancekinzer.com/041508 
update.html.  The sponsor of H.B. 2825, Rep. Lance Kinzer (R-Olathe), identified the Kansas 
Supreme Court cases that concerned him as Comprehensive Health of Planned Parenthood of Kan. 
& Mid-Mo., Inc. v. Kline, 197 P.3d 370 (Kan. 2008), and State ex rel. Six v. Anderson, No. 99050 
(Kan. Jan. 30, 2009).  The judicial proceedings that concerned Rep. Kinzer focused on allegations by 
former Johnson County District Attorney Phill Kline against former Attorney General Paul 
Morrison.  Kline questioned Morrison’s purpose in gathering certain medical records in 2007.  Kline 
contended that Morrison’s purpose was not to investigate a Wichita doctor, George Tiller, or 
Planned Parenthood of Overland Park for criminal wrongdoing related to abortions.  Rather, Kline 
contended, Morrison’s purpose was to return the records and prevent further investigation.  Morrison 
and Planned Parenthood took legal action against Kline and Judge Richard Anderson, who had 
played a role in the dispute over the records.  When the matter was appealed, court hearings were 
closed, and records were sealed.  See Kevin Wright, Kline Accuses Morrison of Gathering 
Documents for False Purpose, OLATHE DAILY NEWS, Feb. 19, 2008, available at 
http://www.theolathenews.com/101/story/53039.html. 
 361. See § 21-3827 (2007). 
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Other statutes limit access to law enforcement affidavits that state the 
probable cause for issuing warrants.  Such affidavits generally “shall not 
be made available for examination without a written order of the court”; 
the only exception is for access by a defendant or the defendant’s 
lawyer.362  Even after a warrant is executed and returned, media access to 
information about it may be denied if the warrant or affidavit relates to 
an on-going criminal investigation.  The Kansas Open Records Act 
specifically provides that disclosure of a criminal investigation record is 
not required, although a judge may order that it be opened to serve the 
public interest and under certain other conditions.363 
The Kansas Press Association has urged that the Legislature provide 
greater access to warrant information.  For example, in 2006, Senate Bill 
415 was introduced as part of an effort to make search warrant affidavits 
accessible.364  The bill, which died in committee, proposed that affidavits 
be open to the public “after the defendant waives preliminary trial or is 
bound over for trial” and in certain other circumstances.365  In 2007, 
Senate Bill 132 proposed greater access to information about arrest 
warrants after they have been executed.366  Under the proposal, which 
remained in a committee, affidavits filed with executed arrest warrants 
would 
be public court records following the exclusion of information that 
would: 
(a) Interfere with any prospective law enforcement action, criminal 
investigation or prosecution; 
(b) reveal the identity of any confidential source or undercover agent; 
(c) reveal confidential investigative techniques or procedures not 
known to the general public; 
(d) endanger the life or physical safety of any person; or 
 
                                                          
 362. See id. § 22-2302(2) (limiting affidavits on arrests); id. § 22-2502(c) (limiting affidavits 
pertaining to searches). 
 363. See id. § 45-221(a)(10) (Supp. 2008). 
 364. S.B. 415, 2006 Sess. (Kan. 2006), available at http://www.kslegislature.org/bills/2006 
/415.pdf (proposing amendment of § 22-2502). 
 365. See id. 
 366. S.B. 132, 2007 Sess. (Kan. 2008), available at http://www.kslegislature.org/bills/2008 
/132.pdf (proposing amendment to § 22-2302). 
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(e) reveal the name, address, phone number or any other information 
which specifically and individually identifies the victim of any 
sexual offense . . . .367 
Some members of the Kansas media have taken the position that the 
state “is out of step with most other states in keeping probable cause 
affidavits, filed in support of arrest warrants, under seal even after a case 
has gone to trial.”368  The editor of the Wichita Eagle has been quoted as 
saying that criminal proceedings “‘should not be conducted behind a 
curtain.  When they are, citizens are denied a critical opportunity to 
assess the effectiveness of the criminal justice system.’”369 
b. Federal Restrictions 
Federal courts have not generally granted access to search warrant 
affidavits.  In the late 1980s, for example, the Baltimore Sun 
unsuccessfully sought access to an affidavit that an FBI agent had 
prepared to support the issuance of search warrants during a federal 
investigation of the health insurance industry.370  The Fourth Circuit held 
that the affidavit was a judicial record because such a document is 
subject to judicial review and a judge is responsible for filing it with the 
clerk of court.371 
The Fourth Circuit noted that a split of opinion existed “on the 
press’s first amendment right of access to search warrant affidavits.”372  
The court, however, decided that the news media do not have a First 
Amendment right of access to search warrant affidavits, because the 
affidavits historically have not been open to the public.373  In addition, 
warrant papers are not open, because “the subject of the search cannot be 
tipped off to the application for a warrant lest he destroy or remove the 
evidence.”374 
Recognizing that, apart from the First Amendment, the media have a 
common law “qualified right of access,” the Fourth Circuit said that a 
judge must consider “all of the relevant facts and circumstances” in 
                                                          
 367. Id. 
 368. Steve Painter, Opening Arrest Records Splits Prosecutors, Media, WICHITA EAGLE, Feb. 8, 
2006, at B3. 
 369. Id. 
 370. Baltimore Sun Co. v. Goetz, 886 F.2d 60, 62 (4th Cir. 1989). 
 371. Id. at 63. 
 372. Id. at 64. 
 373. Id. 
 374. Id. 
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deciding whether to file warrant papers under seal or determining that 
secrecy is not justified.375 
In 1992, a federal district court in Kansas adopted the Fourth 
Circuit’s position that warrant papers are not accessible as a matter of 
First Amendment right.376  The district court also declined to grant access 
under the common law because of the “sensitive nature of the 
information contained” in the affidavits, the fact that a criminal 
investigation was ongoing, and a need to protect the identities and the 
“privacy interests and safety” of persons mentioned in the affidavits.377 
2. Evidentiary Exhibits 
As journalists report on pre-trial proceedings and trials in criminal 
cases, they often want to inspect evidence that will bear strongly on the 
question of a defendant’s guilt or innocence.  However, attorneys or 
judges may oppose making evidence available to journalists on grounds 
that public disclosure could unfairly prejudice jurors or invade the 
privacy of a trial participant.  Disputes over access to evidence can be 
time-consuming and costly. 
For example, after prosecutors filed charges in connection with 
highly publicized homicides in late 2000 in Wichita, a district judge 
sealed evidence related to the cases.378  After a media challenge to the 
sealing,379 another judge ruled in favor of media access to 911 call 
transcripts and autopsy and firearms testing results, saying they should 
be available under the Kansas Open Records Act.380  A defendant in the 
homicide cases appealed seeking to block access, but was 
unsuccessful.381  Despite the county district attorney’s continuing 
objections, the media ultimately gained access to the evidence.382 
                                                          
 375. Id. at 65. 
 376. In re Flower Aviation of Kan., Inc., 789 F. Supp. 366, 367–68 (D. Kan. 1992). 
 377. Id. at 368. 
 378. Ron Sylvester, Evidence Sealed in 4 Killings—The District Attorney’s Office Has Obtained 
an Order Sealing Public Information in the Case of Four People Shot to Death in a Wichita Soccer 
Field, WICHITA EAGLE, Dec. 30, 2000, at A9. 
 379. Wichita Eagle Beacon Co. v. Owens, 27 P.3d 881 (Kan. 2001); see infra note 445 and 
accompanying text. 
 380. Ron Sylvester, Judge Permits Public Access to Carr Case Records—A Judge Rules that 
Many—But Not All—of the Documents Sealed in the Case Should be Open to the Public, WICHITA 
EAGLE, Aug. 2, 2001, at B1. 
 381. Tim Potter, Court Upholds Public Release of Carr Records—Officials in Wichita Are 
Expected to Release the Information Today, WICHITA EAGLE, Sept. 28, 2001, at B1. 
 382. Ron Sylvester, 911 Call in Quadruple Homicide Is Released, WICHITA EAGLE, Nov. 10, 
2001, at B1. 
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In two recent federal cases involving media access to trial exhibits, 
the judges in both instances ruled in favor of openness.  In 2007, a U.S. 
district judge in New Orleans refused to seal some trial exhibits in a case 
that focused on whether the Allstate Insurance Company had wrongfully 
failed to pay for damage caused by Hurricane Katrina.383  The judge said 
that Allstate did not want to produce manuals and documents that field 
adjusters had used after Hurricane Katrina.384  The company felt that 
production of the materials could “put the company at a competitive 
disadvantage.”385  The judge reasoned, however, that the materials should 
be disclosed because “[p]ublic access serves to enhance the transparency 
and trustworthiness of the judicial process, to curb judicial abuses, and to 
allow the public to understand the judicial system better.”386 
In 2006, in the trial of Zacarias Moussaoui in Alexandria, Virginia, a 
U.S. district court posted photographs and videos related to the 9/11 
terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center, as well as recordings of last 
phone calls made by victims.387  The number of exhibits posted totaled 
1202.388  Because of their graphic nature, the court marked eighteen of 
the exhibits “discretion advised.”389  The court was reportedly the first 
ever to post all exhibits from a trial online.390  Moussaoui had been 
indicted in December 2001, and later pled guilty to charges that he had 
conspired to hijack and fly an airplane into the White House.391  He was 
sentenced to life in prison.392 
3. Criminal History 
The extent to which a criminal’s history may be publicly disclosed 
has been controversial.  The Kansas Attorney General has opined that a 
                                                          
 383. See Weiss v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 06-3774, 2007 WL 2377119, at *5 (E.D. La. Aug. 16, 
2007) (“Because Allstate has provided no justification that outweighs the well-established 
presumption in favor of public access to judicial records, the Court declines to place these exhibits 
under seal.”). 
 384. Id. at *1. 
 385. Id. (quoting Allstate’s motion for protective order). 
 386. Id. at *4 (citing Bahwell v. Stanley-Bostich, Inc., No. Civ. A. 00-0541, 2002 WL 1298777, 
at *1 (E.D. La. June 10, 2002)); see also La. District Court Says Allstate Trial Exhibits Must Remain 
Open, INS. J., Aug. 22, 2007, available at http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/southcentral/ 
2007/08/22/82936.htm. 
 387. 9/11 Trial Exhibits Posted on Website, USA TODAY, July 31, 2006, available at 
http://usatoday.com/news/nation/2006-07-31-moussaoui-exhibits_x.htm. 
 388. Id. 
 389. Id. 
 390. Id. 
 391. Id. 
 392. Id. 
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standard law enforcement arrest report is not an open record.393  An 
arrest report is entered on a form that includes detailed information about 
arrestees, such as their hair style, tattoos, and scars.394  An arrest report is 
classified as a criminal history record that is closed by statute.395  The 
Attorney General also has considered whether a standard offense report 
is the kind of record that may be closed.396  On the first page of an 
offense report, law enforcement authorities enter the description of a 
crime.397  On the next page, they enter information about the method by 
which the crime was committed, evidence collected, and suspects who 
have been identified.398  Because the first page of an offense report 
contains basic, factual information, it is presumed to be open, but the 
second page is viewed as an investigative record and is closed.399 
In addition to the first page of the standard offense report, jail rosters 
and police blotters are open records.400  In providing access to these 
records, the Legislature 
was recognizing the common law right of access to information on 
arrests and intended for the public and press to have access to basic 
information on arrests at a point reasonably contemporaneous with the 
arrest.  This access may come in the form of access to police blotters.  
If a law enforcement agency does not maintain information on arrests 
in a blotter, we believe the law enforcement agency has an obligation to 
make basic blotter-type information about arrests available reasonably 
contemporaneously with the arrest.401 
Now, a movement to restrict access to criminal history information 
has emerged.  An American Bar Association Commission on Effective 
Criminal Sanctions sponsored “a series of resolutions that advocate 
drastically curtailing the public’s access to felony conviction and arrest 
records.”402  The ABA commission was concerned about persons who 
                                                          
 393. See Op. Kan. Att’y Gen. No. 98-38, at 1 (July 14, 1998) (“Standard Arrest Reports are 
mandatorily closed.”). 
 394. Id. at 6. 
 395. Id. at 7 (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4707 (2007) (prohibiting dissemination of criminal 
history information)). 
 396. Id. at 4. 
 397. Id. 
 398. Id. 
 399. Id. (citing § 45-217(c) (Supp. 2008) (defining criminal investigation records) and § 45-
221(a)(10) (stating that criminal investigation records may be closed)).  These statutory sections are 
provisions of the Kansas Open Records Act (KORA) §§ 45-215 to 45-223 (2000 & Supp. 2008). 
 400. See id. at 8 (“[J]ail rosters and police blotter entries are expressly excepted from KORA’s 
definition of criminal investigation records.”). 
 401. Id. at 9. 
 402. Loren Cochran, Blacking Out the Blotter, NEWS MEDIA & L., Summer 2007, at 18, 19. 
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have been convicted of a crime and who have trouble qualifying for 
housing and employment because their criminal history information is so 
readily available, particularly through the Internet.403  The solution 
proposed by the ABA commission was to provide “a way for members of 
the public to petition courts to unseal a file.  But instead of a criminal 
defendant having to prove a file should be sealed, the responsibility 
would shift to the public to prove that it should be unsealed.”404 
Charles D. “Chuck” Tobin, a media lawyer in Washington, D.C., 
objected to the proposal, saying “‘[i]t completely reverses the 
presumption that has been built in four decades of media law . . . [as the] 
Supreme Court has developed a very strong presumption of public access 
to all proceedings and records in the courts.’”405 
4. Expungement 
Like other states, Kansas allows persons convicted of certain crimes 
to expunge their convictions from court records.  The state’s 
expungement statute establishes a process and standards by which a 
judge may order expungement and lists a limited number of persons who 
may have access to an expunged conviction.406  Those with access range 
from the “person whose record was expunged” to law enforcement 
officers who are checking the background of an applicant for a position 
in law enforcement.407 
Although the statute does not allow members of the public and the 
media to view expunged convictions, a newspaper reporter’s request for 
access was considered in a 1980 case, Stephens v. Van Arsdale.408  The 
Kansas Supreme Court upheld a county court clerk’s decision to deny the 
reporter’s request, concluding that expungement as authorized by the 
state legislature is “reasonable and serves a valid and legitimate public 
purpose.”409  The court, however, also recognized “the inherent power 
which courts have over their official records” and said that “a district 
court might in its discretion permit the release of certain documents 
contained in an expunged file in order to achieve the ends of justice.”410  
                                                          
 403. Id. at 18. 
 404. Id. 
 405. Id. 
 406. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4619 (Supp. 2008). 
 407. § 21-4619(i). 
 408. 608 P.2d 972, 975 (Kan. 1980). 
 409. Id. at 985. 
 410. Id. at 986. 
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For example, an expunged conviction might be opened if a newspaper 
needs it to prove truth as a defense against a defamation claim.411  In 
1992, the court considered whether a trial judge properly had allowed a 
litigant to use expunged convictions to impeach a witness in a medical 
malpractice case.412  Although the trial judge’s decision was reversed, 
“the conclusion in Van Arsdale that the courts have inherent power over 
their official records” was affirmed.413 
G. Juror Information 
A 1980 report by the Judicial Conference of the United States took 
into account the possibility that, if jurors serve anonymously in a trial, 
court records that contain identifying information about them may be 
withheld.  A conference committee comment in the report said that, by a 
“special order,” a judge might direct “‘that the names and addresses of 
jurors or prospective jurors not be publicly released except as required by 
statute.’”414 
In the late 1980s, a noteworthy precedent was set in response to a 
media request for access to information about jurors in a federal criminal 
case.  The trial judge refused to give the Baltimore Sun access to a venire 
list that contained information from questionnaires that prospective 
jurors had completed.415  The list included “their names, addresses, 
occupations, marital status, spouse’s name and spouse’s occupation.”416  
The Fourth Circuit, however, held that some of the information was a 
matter of public record, saying that after jurors are seated, their names 
“are just as much a part of the public record as any other part of the case, 
and we think so also are their addresses in order to identify them.”417  At 
the same time, the names and addresses of prospective jurors who are not 
selected also become a matter of public record.  The court explained: 
 
                                                          
 411. See id. at 985–86 (arguing a court may consider releasing expunged files in causes of action 
for libel or slander). 
 412. Pope ex rel. Juby v. Ransdell, 833 P.2d 965, 975 (Kan. 1992). 
 413. Id. at 978. 
 414. Marc O. Litt, “Citizen-Soldiers” or Anonymous Justice: Reconciling the Sixth Amendment 
Right of the Accused, the First Amendment Right of the Media and the Privacy Right of Jurors, 25 
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 371, 376 n.28 (1992) (quoting REVISED REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON THE OPERATION OF THE JURY SYSTEM ON THE “FREE PRESS-FAIR 
TRIAL” ISSUE, 87 F.R.D. 518, 530 (1980)). 
 415. In re Baltimore Sun Co., 841 F.2d 74, 75 (4th Cir. 1988). 
 416. Id. 
 417. Id. 
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[T]he risk of loss of confidence of the public in the judicial process is 
too great to permit a criminal defendant to be tried by a jury whose 
members may maintain anonymity.  If the district court thinks that the 
attendant dangers of a highly publicized trial are too great, it may 
always sequester the jury; and change of venue is always possible as a 
method of obviating pressure or prejudice.418 
Information beyond juror names and addresses should not be disclosed 
“unless some question concerning the same should properly arise within 
the case being tried.”419 
In 2002, the question of media access to juror information received 
thorough consideration in an Ohio case.420  The Supreme Court of Ohio 
said that voir dire was presumptively open and that juror questionnaires 
“expedite the examination of prospective jurors.”421  The court 
concluded: 
 Accordingly, the First Amendment qualified right to open 
proceedings in criminal trials extends to prospective juror 
questionnaires.  Consistent with our reasoning, we note that virtually 
every court having occasion to address this issue has concluded that 
such questionnaires are part of voir dire and thus subject to a 
presumption of openness.422 
H. Civil Court Records 
Although access to court records usually is considered in the context 
of criminal proceedings, the media also may assert that a presumption of 
openness applies to records in civil cases.  For example, the Seventh 
Circuit has ruled in favor of media access to records in shareholder 
actions against corporations.  In In re Continental Illinois Securities 
Litigation, the Seventh Circuit said that “the policy reasons for granting 
public access to criminal proceedings apply to civil cases as well. . . . 
These policies relate to the public’s right to monitor the functioning of 
our courts, thereby insuring quality, honesty and respect for our legal 
system.”423 
                                                          
 418. Id. at 76. 
 419. Id. at 75. 
 420. See State ex rel. Beacon Journal Publ’g Co. v. Bond, 781 N.E.2d 180, 184 (Ohio 2002). 
 421. Id. at 188. 
 422. Id. 
 423. 732 F.2d 1302, 1308 (7th Cir. 1984). 
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1. Depositions 
A court may act to protect a record of a deposition against public 
disclosure.  In a 1999 federal case, the defendants wanted to videotape a 
deposition, and the court found that their motive was “at least in part to 
generate notoriety for themselves and their business ventures by making 
non-litigation use of the videotape.”424  The court allowed the 
videotaping but ordered that it “be used solely for purposes of the 
litigation.”425 
2. Confidential Settlement Agreements 
Concern about confidential settlement agreements has mounted in 
recent years following highly publicized litigation against large 
companies and organizations.  In cases against tire manufacturers, for 
example, plaintiffs blamed defective tires for traffic accidents that 
resulted in death or injury.  When the manufacturers settled, however, 
they maintained secrecy about the alleged tire defects with court 
approval.426  Also noteworthy was litigation against churches in recent 
years, in which plaintiffs claimed they had been molested by priests.  
Under court-approved confidentiality agreements, the churches 
suppressed information about patterns in sexual abuse over many 
years.427 
Sandra Baron, executive director of the Media Law Resource Center 
in New York, a critic of confidential settlements, has said that they 
prevent the public from learning about dangers that are documented in 
litigation.428  She said that confidential settlement agreements result “‘in 
a great deal of information about matters that are in the public interest 
being buried, and they usually aren’t buried forever. . . . They’re buried 
just long enough for a lot of other people to get hurt.’”429 
The Kansas Legislature has indicated that it disfavors secret 
settlements.  In an interpretation of the Kansas Open Records Act, the 
Kansas Attorney General has said that a settlement agreement entered 
                                                          
 424. Paisley Park Enters., Inc. v. Uptown Prods., 54 F. Supp. 2d 347, 348 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); see 
also Drake v. Benedek Broad. Corp., 28 Med. L. Rptr. 1542 (D. Kan. 2000) (allowing video 
recording of the deposition subject to protective measures). 
 425. Paisley Park Enters., Inc., 54 F. Supp. 2d at 349. 
 426. Robert Schwaneberg, The Dilemma of the Secret Settlements, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, 
N.J.), Oct. 19, 2003, at 1. 
 427. Id. 
 428. Id. 
 429. Id. 
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into by a city is a public record, and it cannot be confidential.430  If a 
contractual provision attempts to close the conditions of the settlement 
agreement, it “is void as against public policy.”431  In addition, Kansas 
law now allows a court to seal or redact records only after finding that a 
safety, property, or privacy interest “outweighs the strong public 
interest” in having access to information.432 
According to a 2004 study of federal courts, the District of Kansas 
has rules “covering how long a document may remain sealed (after 
which it is returned to the parties, destroyed, or unsealed).”433  The rules 
include “[n]o restriction on the court’s authority to seal a document.”434 
In general, the study found, a “common law presumption of access 
applies to documents filed with [federal] court[s], although it does not 
apply to documents exchanged in discovery . . . or to settlement 
agreements not filed.”435 
V. SELECTED ISSUES IN ACCESS TO COURT PROCEEDINGS AND 
RECORDS 
A. Media Intervention 
1. Procedure for Objection by a Reporter 
News reporters have learned to be alert if they are present when a 
judge considers a closure order.436  They have been advised to be 
prepared to stand, respectfully request to be heard, and voice an 
objection.437  Following is a sample statement of objection: 
 I am (name), a reporter for (newspaper or broadcaster.)  On behalf 
of both myself and my (paper or station), I would like to note an 
objection to the closure of (or motion to close) this proceeding to the 
                                                          
 430. Op. Kan. Att’y Gen. No. 93-55, at 2 (Apr. 20, 1993). 
 431. Id. at 1. 
 432. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-2617(d) (Supp. 2008); see supra notes 358–60 and accompanying 
text (regarding enactment of H.B. 2825). 
 433. ROBERT TIMOTHY REAGAN ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., SEALED SETTLEMENT 
AGREEMENTS IN FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT 2–3, 3 n.3 (2004), available at http://www.fjc.gov/ 
public/pdf.nsf/lookup/SealSet3.pdf/$file/SealSet3.pdf. 
 434. Id. app. B, at B-11. 
 435. Id. at 1. 
 436. See SAM KLEIN & ROBERT C. CLOTHIER, PA. PRESS ASS’N, MEDIA SURVIVAL KIT 11–14 
(6th ed. 2001), available at http://www.pa-newspaper.org/contentmanager/uploads/PDFs/mansi/ 
kit.pdf. 
 437. Id. at 11–12. 
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public and press, and I request an opportunity to be heard through 
counsel prior to any closure of the proceedings. 
If asked for the basis of your objection, state: 
 I understand that under the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution (and, if in state court, the Constitution of [Kansas]) the 
press and public are afforded the right to attend court proceedings.  At 
the very least, the law requires that a hearing be held, with the press 
given an opportunity to participate, prior to closure.  These arguments 
can best be made by counsel, and I request that our counsel be afforded 
an opportunity to be heard.438 
By reading such a statement, the reporter may gain time and opportunity 
for a lawyer to intervene and present arguments against closure. 
2. Standing to Intervene 
In 1981, when the Kansas Supreme Court ruled in favor of open 
court proceedings in Fossey, the media’s standing to intervene and object 
to a trial judge’s order was not in question.439  In that case, the media had 
filed a motion to intervene, asking the judge to vacate his order to close a 
proceeding and also requesting a copy of the transcript of the 
proceeding.440  After a hearing on the motion, the judge declined to 
vacate his closure order but granted the media’s request for a transcript 
of the closed proceeding.441  The media then petitioned the Kansas 
Supreme Court for mandamus,442 seeking a declaration that the judge’s 
closure order violated the First Amendment.443  Although the Kansas 
Supreme Court denied the petition for mandamus, it established the 
standard for openness that would apply in future cases.444  Reaffirming 
the media’s standing to intervene, the court has said: 
 
                                                          
 438. Language adapted from Pennsylvania Press Association Media Survival Kit.  See id. 
 439. Kan. City Star Co. v. Fossey, 630 P.2d 1176, 1179, 1181–83 (Kan. 1981). 
 440. Id. at 1179. 
 441. Id. 
 442. Id. (stating that mandamus is an appropriate means to “expedite the official business of 
state officials in the discharge of their duties, where the issues are of significant statewide concern of 
a recurring and ongoing nature, and the essential purpose of the proceeding is to obtain an 
expeditious, authoritative interpretation of the law”). 
 443. Id. at 1181. 
 444. See id. at 1181, 1184 (“[T]he reason for requiring all court proceedings to be open . . . is to 
enhance the public trust and confidence in the judicial process and to insulate the process against 
attempts to use the courts as tools for prosecution.”). 
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 We believe an integral part of the rule announced in Fossey . . . is 
the need for a trial court, when considering the sealing of a record or 
the closure of a proceeding, to consider also the societal interest the 
public has in open criminal proceedings and records.  The result here 
effectuates the Fossey rule.  The news media, as a member of the 
public, should be permitted to intervene in a criminal case for the 
limited purpose of challenging a pretrial request, or order, to seal a 
record or close a proceeding in that case, even without an express 
statutory provision allowing such intervention.445 
3. Standing as Analyzed in a Federal Case 
In 1998, in Koch v. Koch Industries, Inc., U.S. District Judge Crow 
analyzed the conditions under which the media may intervene in federal 
court.446  The media sought to object to the gag order that he had issued 
against trial participants, and Judge Crow acknowledged that the media 
had a right to intervene under certain conditions.447  He said that, in 
challenging a gag order, the media “must allege an injury in fact—that 
the court’s order impeded their ability to gather news and ‘that 
impediment is within the zone of interest sought to be protected by the 
first amendment.’”448  In addition, he indicated that the media’s standing 
to challenge a gag order banning advertising would depend on the ban’s 
impact on their financial interest.449 
Judge Crow emphasized First Amendment protection for press 
freedom, saying: 
[A]ny inhibitions against news coverage of a trial carry a heavy 
presumption of an unconstitutional prior restraint.  If a court order 
burdens constitutional rights and the action proscribed by the order 
presents no clear and imminent danger to the administration of justice, 
the order is constitutionally impermissible.  A court may impose a prior 
restraint on the gathering of news about one of its trials only if the 
restraint is necessitated by a compelling governmental interest. 
                                                          
 445. Wichita Eagle Beacon Co. v. Owens, 27 P.3d 881, 883 (Kan. 2001). 
 446. 6 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1188 (D. Kan. 1998), aff’d, 203 F.3d 1202 (10th Cir. 2000). 
 447. Id. at 1188; see supra notes 192–99 and accompanying text.  Judge Crow noted that the 
media may intervene “as of right if: (1) the application is ‘timely’; (2) ‘the applicant claims an 
interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject matter of the action’; (3) the 
applicant’s interest may ‘as a practical matter’ be ‘impair[ed] or impede[d]’; and (4) ‘the applicant’s 
interest is [not] adequately represented by existing parties.’”  Koch, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 1188 (citing 
FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2)). 
 448. Koch, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 1190 (quoting Journal Publ’g Co. v. Mechem, 801 F.2d 1233, 1235 
(10th Cir. 1986)). 
 449. See id. at 1191 n.9 (“This ruling also obviates the need for the court to decide whether or 
not the movants’ own financial interest is sufficient to confer standing to challenge the ban on 
advertising.”). 
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Moreover, the court must narrowly tailor any prior restraint and must 
consider any reasonable alternatives to that restraint which have a 
lesser impact on first amendment rights.  These requirements apply for 
criminal trials as well as civil trials.450 
The media argued that Judge Crow’s gag order impaired their First 
Amendment interest in gathering and reporting news and engaging in 
commercial speech and also prevented them from gaining revenue from 
advertising sales.  Judge Crow, however, ruled that the media did not 
have standing to intervene, although he made his decision only after 
balancing “the parties’ and public’s interest in a fair trial against the 
competing interest in freedom of speech.”451  He found that the media 
lacked standing, in part, because the parties to the litigation had 
requested the gag order and said they did not want to talk to reporters.  
The media has no standing to intervene, he concluded, if the affected 
parties are not willing to speak publicly and be sources of news.452  He 
also decided to dissolve his ban on advertising.453 
In other federal courts, the media have successfully claimed standing 
to object to restrictive judicial orders.  For example, the Second Circuit 
recognized that the media had standing to challenge a gag order issued 
against the prosecutors, defendants, and defense counsel in a trial on 
racketeering and other charges.454  The court found that the gag order 
adversely affected the media, because it interfered with their First 
Amendment-protected right to receive information.455  Defenders of the 
gag order argued that there were no willing speakers to serve as sources 
to the media.456  The court, however, said, “It is hard, in fact, to imagine 
that there are no willing speakers.  Without them there would be no need 
for a restraining order; it would be superfluous.”457  In another case, the 
Third Circuit decided that newspapers had standing to challenge a 
judicial order that had imposed confidentiality on a settlement agreement 
between a town and its former police chief.458  The court applied a 
straightforward principle, saying an intervener has standing when the  
 
                                                          
 450. Id. at 1188–89 (citations omitted). 
 451. Id. at 1189. 
 452. See id. at 1190. 
 453. Id. at 1191. 
 454. In re Application of Dow Jones & Co., 842 F.2d 603, 608 (2d Cir. 1988). 
 455. Id. at 607. 
 456. Id. 
 457. Id. 
 458. Pansy v. Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 777 (3d Cir. 1994). 
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judicial order “being challenged presents an obstacle to the [media’s] 
attempt to obtain access.”459 
B. Secret Dockets 
The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press reported that 
“federal courts and many state courts allow for ‘super-secret’ cases, 
which never appear on the public docket or are hidden using 
pseudonyms, such as ‘Sealed v. Sealed’ or ‘John Doe v. Jane Doe.’”460 
Kansas is not among states in which controversy has erupted over 
secret docketing, and case law on the subject nationally is minimal.461  In 
2007, a federal district judge in Georgia, however, carefully examined 
the law governing sealing and secrecy.  At the time, he was presiding 
over a criminal case that centered on prescription drug fraud.  He said 
precedents made clear that there is a presumption 
against secret documents, secret dockets, secret proceedings, and all the 
real and imagined sins that can be buried within.  That’s why “[j]udicial 
records presumptively are subject to public inspection.” 
 The obvious rationale: this is a court of record precisely to enable 
public and appellate scrutiny and thus uphold confidence in the justice 
system itself.462 
C. Using Court Records to “Out” Informants and Undercover Agents 
Although access to court records is widely recognized as being in the 
public interest, judges have been disturbed by some uses to which the 
records are put.  Certain kinds of data from court records, if disseminated 
globally through the Internet, can invade privacy or create security risks.  
In 2008, for example, the Judicial Conference of the United States 
                                                          
 459. Id. 
 460. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, Secret Justice: Secret Dockets, Summer 
2003, http://www.rcfp.org/secretjustice/secretdockets/index.html (“Courts that maintain these secret 
dockets will neither confirm nor deny the existence of such cases.  As a result, these cases proceed 
through the court system undetected.”). 
 461. As the Reporters Committee has noted, “There isn’t much case law on the issue of secret 
docketing,” although the practice has been held to be unconstitutional by the Second Circuit 
(covering Connecticut, New York, and Vermont) and the Eleventh Circuit (Alabama, Florida, and 
Georgia).  Kirsten B. Mitchell, Reporting Tips, 30 NEWS MEDIA & L. 12 (Spring 2006), available at 
http://www.rcfp.org/news/mag/30-2/cov-reportin.html.  Regarding the unconstitutionality of secret 
docketing, see United States v. Valenti, 987 F.2d 708, 715 (11th Cir. 1993), and Hartford Courant 
Co. v. Pellegrino, 380 F.3d 83, 96 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 462. United States v. Bradley, No. 405CR059, 2007 WL 2874888, at *1–2 (S.D. Ga. Sept. 26, 
2007) (citations omitted). 
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studied the dissemination of information through websites “whose 
purpose is to identify undercover officers, informants, and defendants 
who provide information to law enforcement.”463  The information had 
been gleaned from electronically available federal criminal case files, 
including plea agreements, that identified informants and undercover 
agents.464  One of the websites that features such information is called 
Who’s a Rat; it bills itself as the “largest online database of informants 
and agents!”465  At one point, the site claimed that it had identified 4300 
informers and 400 undercover agents.466  Federal prosecutors were 
“furious,” fearing that exposing the informers and agents would lead to 
“witness intimidation, retaliation and harassment.”467  Judges and law 
enforcement authorities considered the possibility of sealing plea 
agreements or removing them from the federal courts’ electronic records 
retrieval system.468  Judicial Conference committees that studied the 
problem received public comment that ran four-to-one in favor of 
retaining electronic access to plea agreements.469  As a result, the 
committees did not recommend eliminating access, suggesting instead 
that each federal court develop local rules to minimize the exposure of 
sensitive information, including plea agreements.470 
D. Courtroom Control 
1. Use of Cameras as a Privilege 
When the media are present in courtrooms, their use of cameras and 
recording equipment can be a concern to trial judges who aim to 
minimize the effects of publicity on a defendant’s right to a fair trial.  
Even so, the Kansas Supreme Court has granted the news media a 
“privilege” to photograph and record court proceedings. 
The privilege, however, “does not limit or restrict the power, 
authority or responsibility of the judge to control” proceedings or to 
                                                          
 463. Memorandum from James C. Duff, Director of the Administrative Office of the U.S. 
Courts, to Chief Judges, U.S. Courts of Appeals; Judges, U.S. District Courts; and U.S. Magistrate 
Judges (Mar. 20, 2008) [hereinafter Duff Memorandum], available at http://www.federal 
defender.net/Documents/Scrolling_Banner/Plea_Agreements_memo_3-20-08.pdf. 
 464. Id. at 1. 
 465. Who’s a Rat, http://www.whosarat.com (last visited Apr. 21, 2009). 
 466. Adam Liptak, Web Sites Expose Informants, and Justice Dept. Raises Flag, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 22, 2007, at A1. 
 467. Id. 
 468. See Duff Memorandum, supra note 463, at 1. 
 469. Id. at 2. 
 470. Id. at 2–3. 
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“exclude the media or the public at a proceeding or during the testimony 
of a witness.”471  The rules say that “[o]nly audio or visual equipment 
which does not produce distracting light or sound may be used to cover a 
court proceeding.”472 
In Fossey, in 1981, the Kansas Supreme Court noted the 
responsibility of trial judges to manage their courtrooms, saying: 
To safeguard the due process rights of the accused, a trial judge has an 
affirmative constitutional duty to minimize the effects of prejudicial 
pretrial publicity.  And because of the Constitution’s pervasive concern 
for these due process rights, a trial judge may surely take protective 
measures even when they are not strictly and inescapably necessary.473 
Douglas County District Judge Robert Fairchild is among Kansas 
judges who are open to the presence of cameras in the courtroom.  In 
2005, he allowed CBS’s 48 Hours to videotape a high-profile murder 
trial.474  “‘I have granted more access to the media (in this case) than I 
ever have,’” he told the jurors.475  His rules for coverage of the trial by 48 
Hours, however, prohibited videotaping of the jury.476  He viewed the 
trial, with television coverage, as a “learning experience for the 
community.”477  After the trial, 48 Hours broadcast a program nationally 
about the case titled “A Mind for Murder.”478 
All fifty states allow media to record court proceedings to some 
extent, according to the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the 
Press.479  In the federal judicial system, however, only two courts of 
appeal—the Second and Ninth Circuits—allow cameras, according to the 
Reporter’s Committee, and no policy allows cameras in federal trial 
courts.480 
 
 
                                                          
 471. KAN. SUP. CT. R. 1001. 
 472. Id. 
 473. Kan. City Star Co. v. Fossey, 630 P.2d 1176, 1181 (Kan. 1981) (quoting Gannett Co. v. 
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At one point, bi-partisan support emerged in the U.S. House of 
Representatives for the Sunshine in the Courtroom Act of 2007.481  The 
purpose of the bill was to allow district court judges to exercise 
discretion over the media’s use of cameras and recording equipment in 
courtrooms.482  In the U.S. Senate, however, a “move to allow TV 
coverage of all federal appellate and trial court proceedings was 
withdrawn after stiff opposition developed from members of both 
parties.”483 
2. Sketch Artists 
An argument in support of sketch artists is that they should be 
permitted in the courtroom as long as they are not disruptive and their 
sketches would not adversely affect trial participants’ ability to perform 
their roles in the judicial process.484  At times, however, cameras appear 
to be more welcome in courtrooms than sketch artists.  Use of a sketch 
artist was restrained in a 2005 federal trial, in which the defendants were 
accused of engaging in sexual misconduct against mentally ill persons.  
In the case, United States v. Kaufman, the court found that federal law 
“proscribe[d] all forms of identification of the victims in [the] case, 
including . . . sketching for purposes of television.”485  The court also 
prohibited sketching of jurors.486 
Another restraint was imposed against a sketch artist in a 2005 
murder case in Douglas County.  Judge Paula B. Martin ordered the 
Lawrence Journal-World not to publish an artist’s sketches of adult 
witnesses in a murder trial.487  The judge concluded that “courtroom rules 
limiting photography of certain witnesses also apply to drawings by 
sketch artists.”488  The judge later reversed her order, allowing 
publication of the sketches of the adults, but she separately ordered the 
                                                          
 481. H.R. 2128, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 482. See id. 
 483. Terry Frieden, Panel OKs Bill to Televise Open Supreme Court Sessions, CNN.com, Dec. 
6, 2007, http://www.cnn.com/2007/POLITICS/12/06/supreme.court.tv/index.html. 
 484. See Carrie Debra Stopek, Gag Orders: Enhancing Fair Trials or Impeding a Free Press?, 
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 485. No. 04-40141-01, 2005 WL 2648070, at *5 (D. Kan. Oct. 17, 2005) (applying The Crime 
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newspaper not to publish sketches of two young teenagers who testified 
in the case.489 
After filing a motion for reconsideration, which the judge denied, the 
World Company, publisher of the Journal-World, petitioned for 
mandamus in the Kansas Supreme Court.  The World Company argued 
that the judge’s order was erroneous because the rules regarding cameras 
in the courtroom are silent about sketch artists.490 
Asserting that the judge’s order was a prior restraint, the World 
Company said that it had been imposed without a hearing as 
constitutionally required.491  The World Company also argued that there 
was no need for the order, because an artist’s sketch provides 
information to the public but yet is not sufficiently accurate to make 
witnesses identifiable and therefore does not jeopardize their privacy 
interests.492  The World Company moved for an expedited hearing, but 
was unsuccessful.  The Kansas Supreme Court denied the World 
Company’s petition about two months after the trial had ended.493 
3. Bloggers 
For judges, courtroom management now includes responding to 
requests for access from not only traditional journalists, but also 
bloggers. 
In 2007, a federal court took an unprecedented step by allowing 
bloggers to be present during a high-profile trial alongside mainstream 
media representatives.494  During the trial of Vice President Cheney’s 
former chief of staff on charges of perjury and obstruction of justice, the 
Washington Post reported: 
[J]ournalists [were] expected to throng the federal courtroom in 
Washington, far too many for the 100 seats set aside for the media. 
 
                                                          
 489. Eric Weslander, Judge Reverses Ruling Prohibiting Sketches, LAWRENCE J.-WORLD, June 
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 But for the first time in a federal court, two of these seats will be 
reserved for bloggers.  After two years of negotiations with judicial 
officials across the country, the Media Bloggers Association, a 
nonpartisan group with about 1,000 members working to extend the 
powers of the press to bloggers, has won credentials to rotate among his 
members.  The trial of I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby, the highest-ranking 
Bush administration official to face criminal charges, could “catalyze” 
the association’s efforts to win respect and access for bloggers in 
federal and state courthouses, said Robert Cox, the association’s 
president.495 
The Media Bloggers Association is “dedicated to promoting, 
protecting and educating its members; supporting the development of 
‘blogging’ or ‘citizen journalism’ as a distinct form of media; and 
helping to extend the power of the press, with all the rights and 
responsibilities that entails, to every citizen.”496 
4. Court Premises 
The Kansas Supreme Court’s rule on media court coverage prohibits 
recording of “interviews for broadcast in the hallways immediately 
adjacent to the entrances to the courtroom if passageways are blocked or 
judicial proceedings are disturbed thereby.”497  The rule also forbids 
photographers from taking pictures “through the windows or open doors 
of the courtroom,”498 and authorizes judges to “ban cameras from the 
entire floor on which a proceeding is conducted.”499  Such rules exist in 
many states, and judges who enforce them can find themselves locked in 
First Amendment battles with the media.  During a trial in Detroit, 
Michigan, for example, a judge cited a newspaper photographer for 
taking a picture of a witness outside the courthouse.500  The judge also 
cited the photographer’s editor.501  A different judge who reviewed the 
contempt citations dismissed them.502  Lawyers for the newspaper had 
taken the position that, because the photographer had not used his camera 
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inside the courthouse, he was in compliance with applicable rules.503  
They said that punishing the photographer for taking a picture on the 
public grounds outside the courthouse would violate the First 
Amendment.504 
In 2004, when a grand jury was about to consider molestation 
charges against a celebrity in Santa Barbara County, California, a judge 
ordered that the media not publish photos of the grand jurors.505  The 
next day, a freelance photographer for the Associated Press was taking 
pictures outside the county courthouse when “[a] sheriff’s deputy 
demanded the photographer’s camera, flipped through the images and 
deleted one that the deputy decided violated the judge’s order.”506  Tom 
Curley, president and chief executive officer of the Associated Press, 
speaking to journalists, commented: “‘The powerful have to be watched, 
and we are the watchers.  And you don’t need to have your notebook 
snatched by a policeman to know that keeping an eye on government 
activities has lately gotten a lot harder.’”507 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The trend of judicial decisions over many years in Kansas, as well as 
nationally, clearly has favored media and public access to court 
proceedings and records.  The United States Supreme Court has 
recognized that courts historically have been open and that the benefits 
of openness are significant.508  Openness leads to public confidence in 
the judicial system.  It enables the media to illuminate how the justice 
system works and to perform a checking function, holding judges and 
law enforcement accountable for their exercise of power and authority.  
A theme of court precedents nationally and in Kansas is that trial judges 
should take a broad view of their responsibilities.  They do not serve 
merely to protect the fair trial rights of criminal defendants or the privacy 
interests of civil litigants.  They also have an obligation to be as 
transparent as possible and facilitate a free flow of information and 
discourse about the judicial system. 
The appellate courts have provided considerable guidance to judges 
and journalists on the free press/fair trial issue.  When the Kansas 
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Supreme Court made its decision in Fossey in 1981, for example, it 
established a plain, workable standard for determining whether a 
restriction on court access may be warranted.509  Basically, court 
proceedings and records must be open unless disclosure of information 
would pose “a clear and present danger to the fairness of the trial, and . . . 
the prejudicial effect [of openness] cannot be avoided by reasonable 
alternative means.”510 
Before imposing a restriction, a trial judge must give interested 
parties an opportunity to be heard.511  Then, the judge who decides to 
impose a restriction must support it by making specific findings on the 
record.512  The need for a hearing on proposed restraints on court access 
was highlighted in Alston in 1994, when the Kansas Supreme Court 
reversed a judge’s gag order against the Atchison Daily Globe.513  The 
trial judge in Alston had time and opportunity to conduct a hearing before 
issuing a gag order against the Globe.514  He did not schedule a hearing, 
and the Kansas Supreme Court observed that there was “no clear 
showing that it was impossible to serve or notify the parties to be 
restrained.  The judge failed to make the specific findings necessary for 
an ex parte order of prior restraint.”515 
Journalists are devoted to timely reporting on events of the day, 
including court cases.  They may well focus on the interesting or 
sensational features of cases and, as a result, report information that 
damages trial participants.  Ideally, the media would report at least as 
much about the procedural fairness that judges strive to ensure for 
defendants and private litigants.  Nevertheless, under the First 
Amendment, appellate courts generally have recognized that the benefits 
of press freedom to report on the judicial system generally outweigh the 
costs.  For example, in affirming the right of the media to intervene and 
object to judicially imposed restrictions on access, the Kansas Supreme 
Court said: 
 Allowing the news media to intervene in a criminal case . . . may 
provide a trial court with the benefit of argument on the question of 
closure by an advocate of First Amendment and common-law interests.  
Such an argument would not necessarily be made by the State or the 
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defense and might otherwise go entirely unnoticed.  The news media 
may identify, or at least be the strongest proponent of an argument that 
there are . . . “reasonable alternative means” to closure that would avoid 
the prejudicial effect on the defense or prosecution of the dissemination 
of information contained in the record or revealed during a proceeding.  
Other benefits to be derived from permitting the news media to 
intervene include: (1) allowing the court that is most familiar with 
events that may be unfolding rapidly in the case and in the community 
in which the case is pending to make a fully informed closure decision 
in the first instance, (2) less disruption in the processing of the criminal 
case because an appellate court would not be called upon prematurely 
to resolve a challenge by the news media while the criminal case is 
stayed pending the appellate court’s decision, (3) an increase in judicial 
economy, and (4) a more efficient use of judicial resources.516 
Many free press/fair trial controversies have been resolved over the 
years, but new and unsettled issues constantly arise.  Trial judges in 
Kansas will continue to be challenged as media persistently demand 
access to proceedings and records, report with prejudicial effect on 
criminal defendants, or make disclosures that jeopardize the privacy of 
trial participants.  At the same time, judges face an expanding media, 
ranging from bloggers who seek courtroom seats during high-profile 
cases, and who may well be packing cell-phone cameras, to citizen-
operated websites that are devoted to disseminating public but sensitive 
court information, such as the identities of undercover agents.  
Fortunately for trial judges, ample, well-reasoned precedents exist to 
guide them in resolving the issues that they will face. 
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